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INTRODUCTION
The original six Member States of the European Community (EC)
signed the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention) in Brussels on
September 27, 1968.' Thus was laid the foundation of a uniquely
European body of procedural law.2 The Brussels Convention is a
1. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, done Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229
[hereinafter Brussels Convention]. The Convention entered into force for the original six
parties - Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands - on
Feb. 1, 1973. Id., reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229. The official English language version of the
Brussels Convention may be found in 1978 O.J. (L 304) 36. The Convention has undergone
substantial amendments since it was signed in 1968, and in 1990 the Secretariat of the
Council of the European Communities produced a consolidated, unofficial text for the use
of practitioners. 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413 [hereinafter Convention
Consolidated Text]; see also discussion infra part I.E. Portions of the consolidated text are
reproduced below. See infra Appendix.
The Brussels Convention is ancillary to the Treaty of Rome, which established the
European Community, and therefore is not directly enforceable under the doctrine of direct
applicability set out in article 189 of the Treaty of Rome. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], art. 189. Accordingly, Member States
of the European Community must take whatever steps are necessary under their domestic
laws to ratify and implement the Brussels Convention.
2. The Brussels Convention has been described as the "foundation of a 'European Law
of Procedure."' Christian Kohler, Practical Experience of the Brussels Jurisdiction and
Judgments Convention in the Six Original Contracting States, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 563,
563 (1985); see also Paul Volken, The Lugano Convention in the Framework of Legal
Unification of Europe, in THE LUGANO AND SAN SEBASTIAN CONVENTIONS 3, 5-6 (David
Vaughan et al. eds., 1990).
The rapporteurs of a later convention of accession to the Brussels Convention note that
the Convention regime is "a genuine European legal area" that is "destined to extend well
beyond the relations between the Member States of the European Communities." Report
by Martinho de Almeida Cruz et al. on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom
of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its Interpretations by
the Court of Justice with the Adjustments Made to Them by the Convention on the
Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Adjustments Made to Them by the Convention on the
Accession of the Hellenic Republic, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 35, 38, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1471,
1472 [hereinafter 1990 Cruz Report].
These words have proved prescient, since the entry into force of the Brussels
Convention foreshadowed not merely the beginning of a European Community law of
procedure but also of a European law of procedure. As European States have become
members of the EC, they likewise have become members of the Convention. Moreover, the
Member States of the Community in 1988 signed an agreement with the Member States of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) setting out jurisdictional rules and rules
relating to the enforcement of judgments among members of the EC and the EFTA. See
discussion infra part I.D. This 1988 agreement, known as the Lugano Convention, mirrors
the Brussels Convention and establishes a body of procedural law applicable not merely to
the EC but to all of Western Europe. One writer observes that with the final accession
convention and the agreement with the EFTA,
[a] most important result has thus been obtained, i.e. the realization of a uniform text
effective for the 12 States of the EEC and the 6 EFTA States (and therefore effective
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tremendous accomplishment in EC law.3 It has radically altered the
manner in which judgments may be recognized and enforced in the EC,
wholly replacing the convoluted system of bilateral recognition and
enforcement treaties4 existing between Member States. 5  Under the
in the whole of Western Europe). . . . The area for the "free circulation of judicial
decisions" in civil and commercial matters has therefore become extremely great; it is
probable that in the coming years there will be further extensions towards the Eastern
European countries.
S. Pieri, The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters: The Evolution of the Text and the Case Law of the Court
of Justice Over the Last Four Years, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 537, 543-44 (1992).
3. Kohler, supra note 2, at 563. Kohler observes:
The practical significance of the [Brussels] Convention for the Contracting States in
everyday legal terms can hardly be overestimated if one considers that it covers, both
as regards jurisdiction and as regards the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, the majority of all civil actions which involve connections with other
Contracting States; when it was estimated ... that the Convention would be relevant
in approximately 20,000 cases each year, that figure was probably not put too high.
Id. at 564.
4. The Brussels Convention is a "double" convention in the sense that it deals with
both jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The
Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 998 (1967). Insofar as it is possible,
however, this article is confined to the latter aspect of the treaty.
The two aspects of the convention -jurisdiction and enforcement- are not unrelated.
The rapporteurs of a later accession convention note that the
aim of the Brussels Convention is to simplify the formalities needed for mutual
recognition and enforcement of court decisions. For this reason the Convention begins
by specifying the rules of jurisdiction regarding the courts before which proceedings
are to be brought in civil and commercial matters relating to property. The Convention
goes on to lay down a procedure for the enforcement of judgments given in another
Member State which is simpler than traditional arrangements and swift because the
initial stages are non-adversarial.
P. Jenard & G. MOiler, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, 1990
O.J. (C 189) 58, 64, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1481, 1484 [hereinafter 1990 Jenard Report].
On the jurisdictional aspect of the Brussels Convention, see generally PETER BYRNE,
THE EEC CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS ch. 3
(1990); ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
CONVENTION 17-33 (1987); PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 251-1208 (1987) [hereinafter KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION]; D. LASOK
& P.A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 197-286 (1987);
Beverly May Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention - Its Threat and Challenge
to Americans, 8 INT'L LAW..446 (1974); Joseph Halpern, "Exorbitant Jurisdiction" and the
Brussels Convention: Toward a Theory of Restraint, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 369
(1983); Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European
Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (1984); Peter Kaye, Nationality and
the European Convention on the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, 37 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 268 (1988); Errol P. Mendes, The Troublesome Workings of the Judgments
Convention of the European Economic Community, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1980);
Geoffrey D. Oliver, Note, Future Interpretations of Article 17 of the Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in the European Communities, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 289 (1985).
5. Author Christian Kohler writes:
The entry into force [of the Brussels Convention] . . . placed international legal
relations in the six original Contracting States on an entirely new footing.... [R]ules
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Brussels Convention, a judgment rendered in one Member State is
automatically recognized and enforceable in all other Member States, with
some limited exceptions. For this reason, the Convention has been
described as the European equivalent of the United States Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause.6
This year will mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the
Brussels Convention and the twentieth year since the Convention entered
into force among the original EC Member States. Since 1968, six new
European States have become members of the EC and signatories of the
Brussels Convention,7 and the twelve Member States of the EC have
signed a parallel judgments convention with the Member States of the
EFTA.8 The Brussels Convention regime, as modified and amended by
these later treaties, will soon enter into force among all twelve Member
States of the EC and among all six members of the EFTA - comprising
the whole of Western Europe.9 The significance of this accomplishment
cannot be overestimated.
This article is directed at two objectives. It will first provide, in Part
I, an outline of the history of the Brussels Convention from its inception
to the present day. It will examine the growth of the Convention from
on the recognition of foreign judgments, which took centuries to develop, no longer
had any validity. Jurisdictional privileges and other expressions of national interest had
to be foregone. Labyrinths of dogmas which had assumed awe-inspiring proportions
in continental jurisprudence in connection with international procedural law were
overturned - only, however, to be replaced by new ones.
Kohler, supra note 2, at 563.
6. See, e.g., Lee S. Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An
Analysis of the Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 44 (1975); see also Bruce M.
Landay, Another Look at the EEC Judgments Convention: Should Outsiders Be Worried?,
6 DICK. J. INT'L L. 25, 25 (1987).
7. See infra part I.C.
8. See infra part I.D.
9. The 1989 San Sebastian Convention, which is the latest convention of accession to
the Brussels Convention, is in force among eight of the twelve members of the EC: France,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Council Communication, 1992 O.J. (C 144) 1. The remaining members - Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, and Ireland - have not yet ratified the 1989 San Sebastian Convention
but nevertheless remain bound by earlier versions of the Brussels Convention. The Council
of the EC is the official depository of the 1989 San Sebastian Convention, and current
ratification information may be obtained from it. On the 1989 San Sebastian Convention
and the other conventions of accession to the Brussels Convention, see infra part I.C.
The 1988 Lugano Convention among the Member States of the EC and the EFTA
entered into force on January 1, 1992 for France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The following States
have not yet ratified the treaty: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Greece, Germany, Denmark, and
Belgium. Spain and Ireland have not signed the treaty. Current ratification information may
be obtained from the Swiss Federal Council, which is the official depository of the 1988
Lugano Convention. On the 1988 Lugano Convention, see infra part I.D.
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a vague undertaking of the six original Member States of the EC, through
various treaties of accession and the 1988 Lugano Convention with the
EFTA, and finally to the text currently in force. Part II will discuss the
nature of the Convention and the philosophy behind it.
The second purpose of this article is a more pragmatic one: to
provide the practitioner with a working understanding of the way in
which a judgment rendered in one European State may be recognized and
enforced in another. In Part III, the article covers the general consider-
ations applicable to the recognition and enforcement of judgments under
the Convention, the subjects to which the Convention applies, and the
four matters to which it does not apply.
Part IV is devoted to the recognition of judgments, which is the first
step toward enforcement. This discussion sets out the general rule that
a judgment rendered in one Member State is to be given "automatic"
recognition in all other Member States. This rule, however, is subject to
the qualification that a State need not recognize a judgment if, among
other things, the judgment is: (1) contrary to the public policy of the
State, (2) rendered in default of appearance without adequate notice being
served, or (3) irreconcilable with a judgment rendered by the State in a
dispute between the same parties. Part IV then sets forth the procedural
steps necessary to obtain recognition of a judgment amenable to the
automatic rule. A discussion of the enforcement of judgments is
contained in Part V. This portion of the article provides a practical
discussion of the method by which a judgment, once recognized, may be
given legal effect.
Finally, note that under the 1971 Interpretation Protocol, the European
Court of Justice has jurisdiction to issue interpretive rulings in matters
brought before it under the Brussels Convention. Where these rulings are
relevant, an attempt has been made to incorporate them into the discus-
sion.
I. THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION IN ITS CURRENT FORM
Because the text of the Brussels Convention has been substantially
modified since it was originally signed in 1968, it is appropriate to trace
the history of the Convention to its present state.
A. The 1968 Brussels Convention
The Brussels Convention was drafted pursuant to article 220 of the
Michigan Journal of International Law
Treaty of Rome, the treaty which established the EC.' ° Article 220
provides in pertinent part: "Member States shall, so far as is necessary,
enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the
benefit of their nationals ... the simplification of formalities governing
the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or
tribunals and of arbitration awards."" In 1959, pursuant to article 220, 12
the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States
selected a Committee of Experts to draw up a draft convention. 13 The
Committee of Experts met for the first time on July 11, 1960.14 More
than four years later, the Committee produced a preliminary draft
convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the enforcement of
authentic instruments. 5 This draft, which was to become the Brussels
10. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (citing EEC TREATY, art. 220); see also
1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 38, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472; BYRNE, supra note
4, at 1-2. It has been observed that an alternative to the Brussels Convention might have
been for the Member States to amend the existing network of bilateral treaties already in
force. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Outer World and the Common Market Experts' Draft
of a Convention on Recognition of Judgments, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 409, 411 (1968);
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 45. The Convention expressly supersedes these pre-existing
agreements. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 55; see also BYRNE, supra note 4, at
1-2.
11. Commentators observed, even before the draft convention was opened for signature,
that any European convention for the recognition of judgments should not be constrained
by the limited and somewhat ill-advised language of article 220. Professor Nadelmann of
Harvard noted that the language of article 220 "suggests that the draftsmen were not expert
in the judgments field. The difficulties between member states over recognition ofjudgments do not arise from insistence on compliance with formalities but are due to
substantive rules adverse to recognition of foreign judgments." Nadelmann, supra note 4,
at 996.
Fortunately, the Brussels Convention is not constrained by the terms of article 220.
Hartley notes that "[i]n spite of the wording of the Article, the Convention is not limited to
those cases where the judgment is in favour of a Community national; arbitration awards,
on the other hand, are excluded." T.C. Hartley, The Recognition of Foreign Judgments in
England Under the Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in HARMONISATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE E.E.C. 103, 103 (K. Lipstein ed., 1978).
12. Although article 220 does not expressly mandate such a treaty as the Brussels
Convention, "it has always been assumed that the reference to 'negotiations' carries the
necessary implication that treaties, rather than regulations or directives, are the appropriate"
method for Member States to discharge their article 220 obligations. Elizabeth Freeman,
The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments,
3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 496, 496-97 (1981).
13. Report by Mr. P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 Sept. 1968 on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1, 3[hereinafter 1979 Jenard Report]. The Committee of Experts consisted of delegates from
the six Member States, observers from the Benelux Committee on the Unification of Law,
observers from the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and representatives from
various departments of the EC Commission. Id.
14. Id.
15. COM(64)14371/IV; see also Mendes, supra note 4, at 76-77 n.8. Meanwhile,
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Convention, was circulated for comment and was eventually adopted by
the Committee of Experts in 1966.16 The Convention was signed in
Brussels on September 27, 1968 and on February 1, 1973, the Convention
entered into force with respect to the original Member States of the
Community - Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. 7
B. The 1971 Interpretation Protocol
In 1971, the original Member States of the EC signed a protocol
granting the European Court of Justice the competence to interpret the
Brussels Convention.' By providing for objective review of Convention
terms, the signatories sought to eliminate the problem of varying
interpretations of the Convention - a significant issue in light of the
diverse legal traditions of the several Member States. 19 In addition, the
members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law were busy on a draft
judgments convention of their own. The first meeting of the conference took place in 1964
after publication of the Committee of Experts' preliminary draft. Twenty-three members,
including six members of the Community, were present at the 1964 session. See Kurt H.
Nadelmann & Willis L.M. Reese, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 612 (1964). This work resulted in the Draft
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, reprinted in 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 361 (1967) (English text as it appears
in the Final Act of the Extraordinary Session). The Hague draft has never entered into
force. See Landay, supra note 6, at 33-36.
16. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 3.
17. See supra note 1.
18. Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of Sept.
27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, done June 3, 1971, 1975 O.J. (L 204) 28 [hereinafter 1971 Interpretation Protocol].
The official English language version of the Protocol is published at 1978 O.J. (L 304) 50.
The Secretariat of the Council of Europe has produced a consolidated and updated version
of the 1971 Interpretation Protocol. 1990 O.J. (C 189) 25, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1439
(1990); see also infra part I.E.
The original text of the Brussels Convention does not specifically address the subject
of interpretation, although a joint declaration appended to the Convention stipulates that the
parties would examine the possibility of conferring interpretive authority upon the Court of
Justice. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, joint declaration. The signatories effected
this obligation by signing the 1971 Interpretation Protocol.
The rapporteur for the Brussels Convention produced a report on the 1971 Interpreta-
tion Protocol. Report by Mr. P. Jenard on the Protocols of 3 June 1971 on the Interpretation
by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 29 February 1968 on the Mutual Recognition
of Companies and Legal Persons and of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J.
(C 59) 66. On the 1971 Interpretation Protocol, see generally Hjalte Rasmussen, A New
Generation of Community Law? Reflections on the Handling by the Court of Justice of the
Protocol of 1971 Relating to the Interpretation of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 249 (1978); see also DASHWOOD
ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 6.
19. Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 249-50. The difficulty in interpreting the Brussels
Convention was exacerbated by the fact that the Convention was produced in four official
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Protocol circumvents any question as to whether, under the Brussels
Convention, the European Court could interpret the provisions of the
Convention. Under the Protocol, which entered into force on September
1, 1975,20 the courts of Member States may ask the European Court to
issue interpretive rulings on the Brussels Convention and its various
attendant treaties and agreements.2'
The 1971 Protocol is a singular event in the continuing history of
legal, social, and political integration in Europe. The European Court of
Justice is the first international court to be afforded jurisdiction over a
private international law convention. One writer observes that this
aspect must be particularly stressed because of the important role played
in recent times by the European Court in promoting a more intensive
integration between the member States and in asserting the primacy of
European law over national laws. Therefore the Court has been given
an opportunity of solving, in a unitary European perspective, the
problems of interpretation arising from the 1968 Convention. 22
The Court of Justice has certainly availed itself of this opportunity and
has, on several occasions, interpreted disputed Convention terms by
adopting a Community definition instead of a definition favored by a
particular Member State.23  The Court rendered its first interpretive
languages: French, German, Italian, and Dutch. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art.
68; Peter Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments: An Interim Update, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 428-29 (1977).
Moreover, curiously absent from the Convention text is any provision for interpretation.
Andrea Giardina notes:
If the Brussels Convention is compared to other international instruments, one is struck
by the absence of a general clause giving national judges some guidelines designed to
overcome difficulties of interpretation and application....
The reasons for the lack of general clauses in the Convention imposing harmonising
interpretations are understandable. Because the Convention interferes profoundly and
intensively in national systems, its negotiation and subsequent ratification by the EEC
States might have met with even greater obstacles if such a clause had been provided
for. Moreover, the preliminary interpretation of the Convention by the Court in
Luxembourg was certainly envisaged by the draftsmen at the outset, eventual
harmonisation being envisaged by other means.
Andrea Giardina, The European Court and the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Judgments, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 263, 267-68 (1978).
20. 1971 Interpretation Protocol, supra note 18.
21. For numerous reasons, the Court of Justice is without authority to interpret the
Lugano Convention, the 1988 agreement signed by the Member States of the EC and the
EFTA. See infra part I.D. The Lugano Convention, however, provides for another
mechanism to ensure the uniform interpretation of the text. See infra note 56.
22. Giardina, supra note 19, at 265.
23. In particular, see the discussion of the Eurocontrol decision infra part III.A.1. See
also infra note 76.
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rulings under the Protocol in October 1976.24
C. The 1978, 1982, and 1989 Accession Conventions
One of the fundamental principles of the Brussels Convention is that
"any State which becomes a member of the European Economic
Community is required to accept the Convention as a basis for the
negotiations necessary to ensure the implementation of Article 220 of the
Treaty of Rome."25 Since 1968, when the Brussels Convention was first
signed by the original Member States of the Community, several
European States have become members of the EC and have duly acceded
to the Brussels Convention.
When the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark became members
of the EC in 1973,26 they agreed in a separate act of accession to enter
into negotiations with a view toward accession to the Brussels Conven-
27tion. The Committee of Permanent Representatives to the Community
set up a working party to negotiate the accession of the new Member
States to the Brussels Convention.28 Lengthy negotiations followed,
resulting in a 1978 convention of accession which also modified and
amended the Brussels Convention.29 The Convention entered into force
24. See generally Giardina, supra note 19. The first three cases were Case 29/76, LTU
Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. 1541, 1 C.M.L.R.
88 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by the Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal],
Disseldorf, Germany); Case 14/76, Ets. A. de Bloos, S.P.R.L. v. Soci6td en commandite par
actions Boyer, 1976 E.C.R. 1497, 1 C.M.L.R. 60 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by
the Cour d'Appel [Court of Appeal], Mons, France); and Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili
Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E.C.R. 1473, 1 C.M.L.R. 26 (1977) (preliminary ruling
requested by the Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Frankfurt am Main, Germany).
25. 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 38, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472. See
generally Herzog, supra note 19, at 433-39.
26. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
European Economic Community (and to the European Atomic Energy Community), Jan. 22,
1972, 1972 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 73) 5.
27. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustment to the Treaties,
1972 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 73) 14. The Act obligated new Member States to
undertake to accede to the conventions provided for in Article 220 of the [EEC Treaty,
including afortiori the Brussels Convention], and to the protocols on the interpretation
of those conventions by the Court of Justice, signed by the original member States, and
to this end they undertake to enter into negotiations with the original Member States
in order to make the necessary adjustments thereto.
Id. art. 3. The Brussels Convention itself requires new Member States to accede, Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 63, as does the Interpretation Protocol, 1971 Interpretation
Protocol, supra note 18, art. 9.
28. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 5-6.
29. Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its
Interpretations by the Court of Justice, Oct. 9, 1978, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 1, reprinted in 18
568 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 14:559
on June 1, 1988 among the six original Member States, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. 30  The 1978 Accession Convention
amended the Brussels Convention on numerous points necessary to
accommodate the interests of the new Member States, 31 but without
altering the fundamental principles of the original agreement.
32
In 1982, following its accession to the Treaty of Rome, Greece also
acceded to the Brussels Convention.33 The Convention which entered
into force between Greece and the other parties on October 1, 198931
provided purely technical amendments to the Brussels Convention.
Spain and Portugal signed a convention of accession to the Brussels
Convention in 1989, after their accession to the EC.36 This treaty, known
I.L.M. 8 [hereinafter 1978 Accession Convention]. The Brussels Convention, as modified
and amended by the 1978 Accession Convention, is reproduced at 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77.
On the Accession Convention, see Report by Professor Dr. Peter Schlosser on the
Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on
its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 71 [hereinafter 1979 Schlosser
Report].
30. 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, Annex I, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1479.
31. One writer groups these amendments into four categories:
The first concerns technical alterations necessary to make the Convention applicable
to the jurisdictions of the new Member States. The second is intended to make the
Convention applicable to certain legal institutions typical of anglo-saxon law .... The
third category particularly concerns certain institutions under maritime law ....
Finally, a fourth group of norms, the most important category, was altered for
substantial reasons ....
Pieri, supra note 2, at 538-39 (citations omitted). This final group concerned amendments
to the provision on choice of forum, the maintenance of obligations, and certain jurisdiction-
al changes. Id. at 539-42.
32. 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 39, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472.
33. Convention on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the
Protocol on Its Interpretation by the Court of Justice with the Adjustments Made to Them
by the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland, and of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sept. 25, 1982, 1982 O.J. (L 388)
1 [hereinafter 1982 Accession Convention]. An explanatory report was produced by
Professors Demitrios Evrigenis and K.D. Karameus, 1986 O.J. (C 298) 1.
34. 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, Annex I, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1479.
35. Id. at 39, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472. An unofficial consolidated version of the
Brussels Convention as amended by the 1978 and 1982 Accession Conventions has been
produced by the Council General Secretariat. Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1983 O.J. (C 97) 2.
36. Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic
to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its Interpretations by the Court of Justice with
the Adjustments Made to Them by the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of
Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Adjustments Made to Them by the Convention on the Accession of the Hellenic
Republic, May 26, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1 [hereinafter 1989 San Sebastian Convention].
An official report on the Convention was published in 1990. 1990 Cruz Report, supra note
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as the San Sebastian Convention, makes certain technical adjustments37
to the Brussels Convention and conforms the basic text of the Brussels
Convention to the 1988 Lugano Convention with the Member States of
the EFTA, 38 discussed below. 39 The agreement provides that it will enter
into force when ratified by two signatory States, one of which is Spain
or Portugal.4° The 1989 San Sebastian Convention is presently in force
among eight members of the EC.4
D. The 1988 Lugano Convention
In 1988, the Member States of the EC and the Member States of the
EFTA42 concluded a convention in Lugano, Switzerland on jurisdiction
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.43
Known as the Lugano Convention, the agreement was intended to ensure
the free movement of judgments among Member States of the EC and the
EFTA. 44 The Convention rapporteurs note:
Because of the magnitude of trade between the EEC Member States and
2. See generally Tony Hunter-Tilney, The San Sebastian Convention, in THE LUGANO AND
SAN SEBASTIAN CONVENTIONS, supra note 2, at 61.
The 1989 San Sebastian Convention further modifies the Brussels Convention. Most
notably, the agreement conforms the basic text of the Brussels Convention, as amended, to
the 1988 Lugano Agreement, a recognition convention among the Member States of the EC
and the Member States of the EFTA. The Lugano Convention is discussed below. See
infra part I.D.
37. See 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 42-44, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1474-75.
38. See id. at 44-49, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1475-77.
39. See infra part I.D.
40. 1989 San Sebastian Convention, supra note 36, art. 32. The rapporteurs note:
An accelerated entry into force of the Convention has been intentionally sought after.
This intention was confirmed by the Declaration annexed to the Convention, which
establishes a link between the Brussels Convention and the completion of the internal
market and urges the States to adopt appropriate measures for ratification as soon as
possible and, if possible, by 31 December 1992.
1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 51, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1478. The 1992 deadline,
however, has come and gone. See supra note 9.
41. These are France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom. See supra note 9.
42. The Member States of the EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland. The 1988 Lugano Convention is presently in force among France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. See supra note 9.
43. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 6, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 [hereinafter Lugano
Convention].
44. 1990 Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 61, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1482. The
Lugano Convention - like the Brussels Convention - also addresses jurisdiction, a subject
not covered by this article. See generally Michael Carpenter, The Lugano Convention and
the European Community, in THE LUGANO AND SAN SEBASTIAN CONVENTIONS, supra note
2, at 19.
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EFTA, it was to be expected that the need would arise for a judgment
given in a Community Member State to be enforced in an EFTA
country, or for a judgment given in an EFTA member country to be
enforced in a Member State of the European Communities. 5
The Lugano Convention therefore has the remarkable effect of estab-
lishing a basic text on jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign
judgments applicable in the whole of Western Europe.
The history of the Lugano Convention begins in 1973 when Sweden
first indicated its interest in some form of agreement with the EC for the
recognition of judgments.46 Little happened until 1981 when Switzerland
expressed similar interest.47 A draft convention was produced relatively
quickly after preparatory proceedings commenced in 1985, 4 and the
Convention was opened for signature following a diplomatic conference
held in Lugano between September 12 and September 16, 1988.49
The Lugano Convention is based substantially on the Brussels
Convention, and the two conventions share many identical provisions.5"
45. 1990 Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 64, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1484.
46. Id., reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1484.
47. Id., reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1484.
48. Id. at 64-65, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1484. Among other things, the working
party considered the possibility that instead of producing a new agreement, the Member
States of the EFTA could simply accede to the Brussels Convention. The rapporteurs note,
however, as follows:
This possibility was not followed up because, being based on Article 220 of the Treaty
of Rome and being the subject of the Protocol of 3 June 1971 which entrusted the
Court of Justice of the European Communities with the power to interpret the
Convention, the Brussels Convention is a Community instrument and it would have
been difficult to ask non-Member States to become signatories.
Id. at 65, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1484.
49. Id., reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1484.
50. The rapporteurs note that "the structure of the two Conventions is identical and they
contain a great number of comparable provisions." Id. at 67, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1485;
see also 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 39, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472; BYRNE,
supra note 4, at 8.
In connection with the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the official report
on the agreement observes that
The two Conventions are based on identical fundamental principles which can be
summarized as follows:
Sixth Principle:
Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement are limited.
Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 26 of both Conventions, judgments given in
a Contracting State must be recognized in the other Contracting States without any
special procedure being required. In other words, judgments are entitled to automatic
recognition: the Conventions establish the presumption in favour of recognition and the
only grounds for refusal are those listed in Articles 27 and 28.
Seventh Principle:
The enforcement procedure is unified and simplified.
It is unified in that, in every Contracting State, the procedure is initiated by submission
[Vol. 14:559
Summer 1993] Judgments in the European Community
The agreements nevertheless "remain separate Conventions,"51 and
application of the Lugano Convention is limited by its terms to specific
situations.52 Article 54B of the Lugano Convention addresses the
interrelationship between that Convention and the Brussels Convention.53
Article 54B notes that the Lugano Convention "shall not prejudice the
application" of the Brussels Convention,54 but that it shall apply "in
matters of recognition and enforcement, where either the State of origin
or the State addressed is not a member of the European Communities.
A protocol annexed to the Lugano Convention establishes a system
designed to ensure the uniform interpretation of the agreement. 56 The
operation of the Lugano Convention is discussed below in conjunction
of an application.
It is simplified in particular with reference to the appeals procedure.
The Lugano Convention makes a number of technical adjustments as against the 1968
Convention ....
1990 Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 65-67, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1485.
51. Id. at 67, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1485. Despite the similarity of the two
agreements, there are a number of provisions that distinguish the two. Id. at 69-70,
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1486-87. Perhaps the most important feature of the Brussels
Convention regime not shared by the Lugano Convention is that the Brussels Convention,
in accordance with the 1971 Interpretation Protocol, is subject to the interpretation of the
European Court of Justice. See discussion infra note 56.
52. Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 54B.
53. See 1990 Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 67-69, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1485-86.
54. Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 54B(1).
55. Id. art. 54B(2).
56. The drafters of the Lugano Convention were confronted with the danger that the
courts of EFTA Member States might interpret the Lugano text differently than the Brussels
Convention had been interpreted in the EC. It was also conceivable that courts of EFTA
Member States might disagree among themselves over the interpretations of various terms.
The Convention rapporteurs noted that
[w]ithout uniform interpretation, the unifying force of the Lugano Convention would
be considerably reduced. In addition, a considerable number, if not the majority, of
its provisions are reproduced from the Brussels Convention, which posed a further
problem. As we know, in order to avoid such differences of interpretation, the
Community Member States concluded a Protocol on 3 June 1971 giving jurisdiction
to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to rule on the interpretation of
the Brussels Convention....
However, the Court of Justice could not be assigned jurisdiction to interpret the Lugano
Convention which is not a source of Community law. Furthermore, the EFTA Member
States could not have accepted a solution according to which an institution of the
Communities would, as a court of last resort, rule on the Lugano Convention.
1990 Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 89, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1496.
In response to these potential problems, the signatories of the Lugano Convention
agreed on a protocol designed to ensure the uniform interpretation of the treaty. Lugano
Convention, supra note 43, Protocol 2 (on the Uniform Interpretation of the Convention).
Under this interpretation protocol, judgments delivered under the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions are to be communicated to central authorities in each signatory State.
Moreover, meetings are to be held from time to time in which representatives of the various
signatory States shall exchange their views on the functioning of the Lugano Convention.
1990 Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 89-93, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1496-98.
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with the discussion of the operation of the Brussels Convention.
E. The Present Text
The 1968 text of the Brussels Convention has been substantially
altered by the subsequent treaties and agreements discussed above,
rendering a coherent reading of the current Convention text somewhat
difficult.57 Recognizing this difficulty, the Secretariat of the Council of
Europe in 1990 produced a consolidated and updated version of the
Brussels Convention. A consolidated version of the 1971 Protocol was
also produced. 9 These texts incorporate amendments and revisions to the
1968 text as a result of the 1978, 1982, and 1.989 accession conventions
and the 1988 Lugano Convention. The revised texts, however, have "no
binding effect" and were produced solely for the benefit of legal
practitioners.60
II. THE NATURE OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention is fully consistent with the Treaty of Rome's stated
objective of creating a European "common market.",6' As the economic
ties between Member States expand, so too will the need for a coherent
and uniform set of rules concerning the enforcement of judgments
rendered in other Member States. The Commission of the EC recognized
this need early on, observing in a note sent to Member States on October
22, i959 that a "true internal market between.the [Member] States will
be achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured.,
62
57. For a general discussion of the history of amendments to the Brussels Convention
that have culminated in the present text, see Pieri, supra note 2.
58. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1.
59. Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27
September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 25, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1439 [hereinafter 1971 Interpretation
Protocol Consolidated Text].
60. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1 (preliminary note).
61. EEC TREATY, art. 2.
62. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 3. The note continues:
The economic life of the Community may be subject to disturbances and difficulties
unless it is possible, where necessary by judicial means, to ensure the recognition and
enforcement of the various rights arising from the existence of a multiplicity of legal
relationships. As jurisdiction in both civil and commercial matters is derived from the
sovereignty of Member States, and since the effect of judicial acts is confined to each
national territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the common market are
essentially dependent on the adoption by the Member States of a satisfactory solution
to the problem of recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 6, at 44 ("The drafters of the Rome Treaty ... recognised
that the development of a stable economic union would be seriously hampered if
enforcement of claims arising from economic transactions were uncertain, time-consuming
[Vol. 14:559
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The Brussels Convention ensures that judgments may move as freely
as goods, workers, and capital in the common market of Europe.63 The
hallmark of the EC system is the virtual elimination of national bound-
aries for purposes of trade; customs duties are eliminated, 6 workers may
move freely throughout the Community, 65 and entrepreneurs of one State
may establish business enterprises freely in neighboring Member States.'
Coextensive with the economic unification of Europe is the consolidation
of legal rules governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments. The drafters of the Brussels Convention effectuated the
observation of the Commission that "legal certainty in the common
market [is] essentially dependent on the adoption by the Member States
of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement
of judgments. ' 67 The Brussels Convention affords Member States this
legal certainty.
The genius of the Brussels Convention is that it does not merely
simplify the "formalities governing the mutual recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments, 68 which would not have added much to the existing
structure of bilateral recognition treaties already in force between Member
States. Instead, the Brussels Convention introduces a novel and
streamlined body of laws applicable to the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in Europe.69 Peter Kaye, the author of an invaluable treatise
on the enforcement of foreign judgments, observes that the Committee of
Experts responsible for drafting the Convention recognized that
the real obstacle to easy and effective enforcement was complexity and
diversity of national law conditions therefor, and that consequently, what
was required was facilitation, simplification and unification of such
recognition and enforcement conditions and procedure; existing bilateral
enforcement treaties between individual Member States were divergent
and incomplete; adoption of an indirect, recognition and enforcement
convention would have led to retention of discrimination against
Member States' nationals. 70
to prosecute, and complicated.").
63. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, tit. III.
64. EEC TREATY, arts. 9-17.
65. Id. arts. 48-51.
66. Id. arts. 52-58.
67. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 3.
68. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
69. The 1990 Cruz Report observes that from article 220 of the Treaty of Rome "has
developed, in this specific area, a genuine European legal area which ...is destined to
extend well beyond the relations between the Member States of the European Communities."
1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 38, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472.
70. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 4.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Accordingly, the Committee eschewed the old system of "indirect"
enforcement applicable under pre-existing treaties in favor of "direct"
enforcement, whereby the judgments of one Member State would be
enforceable per se in the courts of another Member State. This approach
ensures legal certainty in the EC, which was a primary goal of the
Committee.7 Kaye writes:
The system used by the Convention's drafters, therefore, was to replace
all existing bilateral enforcement treaties by a single multinational
Convention within the latter's sphere and to secure agreement of
Member States to reduction of national law restraints on recognition and
enforcement and to introduction of a uniform and expeditious enforce-
ment procedure.72
Furthermore, the Convention limits the possible grounds for refusing to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment. This limitation was provided
"in the interests of ensuring the greatest possible freedom of movement
of judgments in the Community., 73
71. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 7. Jenard, the rapporteur of the Committee
of Experts, observed:
[T]he Committee of experts ... felt that within the EEC a convention based on rules
of direct jurisdiction as a result of the adoption of common rules of jurisdiction would
allow increased harmonization of laws, provide greater legal certainty, avoid discrimi-
nation and facilitate the "free movement" of judgments, which is after all the ultimate
objective.
Conventions based on direct jurisdiction lay down common rules of jurisdiction, thus
bringing about the harmonization of laws, whereas under those based on indirect
jurisdiction, national provisions apply, without restriction, in determining international
jurisdiction in each State.
Legal certainty is most effectively secured by conventions based on direct jurisdiction
since, under them, judgments are given by courts deriving their jurisdiction from the
conventions themselves; however, in the case of conventions based on indirect
jurisdiction, certain judgments cannot be recognized and enforced abroad unless
national rules of jurisdiction coincide with the rules of the convention.
id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 6, at 45-46.
72. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 4.
73. 1990 Cruz Report, supra note 2, at 38, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472. The Cruz
Report lists the fundamental principles upon which the Brussels Convention is based:
- it applies only to matters relating to property,
- it lays down rules of direct jurisdiction, i.e. applying from the beginning of the
proceedings,
- the defendant's domicile, and not his nationality, is considered to be the basic rule
for determining the jurisdiction of the courts,
- no derogation from this rule is allowed, unless expressly provided for in the
Convention,
- the defendant's rights must have been respected in the State of origin,
- the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement are limited in the interests of
ensuring the greatest possible freedom of movement of judgments in the Community,
- the exequatur procedure is unified and simplified,
- any State which becomes a member of the European Economic Community is
required to accept the Convention as a basis for the negotiations necessary to ensure
the implementation of Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome; however, the necessary
adjustments may be the subject of special conventions.
[Vol. 14:559
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The European Court of Justice, under authority of the .1971 Inter-
pretation Protocol, has read the Convention in such a way as to promote
Community interests over those of particular Member States.74 In the
Tessili case, the Court's first interpretive ruling under the Protocol, the
Court determined that the Convention must be read in connection with
the principles and objectives of the agreement.75 The Court, however, did
not consider it necessary to determine whether particular Convention
terms should be defined independent of Member State law or whether
reference should be made to Member State law in defining such terms;
instead, the Court ruled that either option should be applied to ensure that
the Convention is effective. In the Eurocontrol decision, hoWever, the
Court determined that the Convention terms were to be given an
independent Community definition, writing that "reference must not be
made to the law of one of the States concerned but, first, to the objectives
and scheme of the Convention and, secondly, to the general principles
which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems. 76
Id. at 38-39, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. at 1472.
Similarly, in his earlier report, Jenard summarizes the characteristic aspects of the
Brussels Convention as follows:
1. the criterion of domicile replaces that of nationality;
2. the principle of equality of treatment is extended to any person domiciled in the
Community, whatever his nationality;
3. rules of exclusive jurisdiction are precisely defined;
4. the right of the defendant to defend himself in the original proceedings is safe-
guarded;
5. the number of grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement is reduced.
In addition, the Convention is original in that:
1. the procedure for obtaining enforcement is standardized;
2. rules of procedure are laid down for cases in which recognition is at issue;
3. provision is made for cases of conflict with other conventions.
1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 8.
74. See generally Kohler, supra note 2, at 565-69.
75. Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E.C.R. 1473, 1
C.M.L.R. 26 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by the Oberlandesgericht [Court of
Appeal], Frankfurt am Main, Germany). The Court noted that the Brussels Convention
implements article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, the purpose of which is to simplify the
formalities of recognition of judgments and to strengthen the legal protection of persons
situated in the Community:
In order to eliminate obstacles to legal relations and to settle disputes within the sphere
of intra-Community relations in civil and commercial matters the Convention contains,
inter alia, rules . . . facilitating the recognition and execution of courts' judgments.
Accordingly, the Convention must be interpreted having regard both to its principles
and objectives and to its relationship with the Treaty.
Id. at 1484, 1 C.M.L.R. at 51; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. On the
Tessili case, see generally Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 261-64.
76. Case 29/76, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, 1976
E.C.R. 1541, 1552, 1 C.M.L.R. 88, 102 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by the
Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Disseldorf, Germany). Subsequent decisions of the
European Court are in accord. See, e.g., Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schr6der,
Mfinchmeyer, Hengst und Co., 1988 E.C.R. 5565, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) 22 (1988)
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III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT
A. The Scope of the Brussels Convention
1. Civil and Commercial Judgments
The scope of the Brussels Convention is limited by its terms to "civil
and commercial matters."77  Subject to certain discrete limitations, 78 a
judgment that falls within the scope of the Brussels Convention must be
recognized and given effect in the courts of every Member State.79
(preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], Germany); Case
9/87, SPRL Arcado v. SA Haviland, 1988 E.C.R. 1539, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 573 (1988)
(preliminary ruling requested by the Cour d'Appel [Court of Appeal], Brussels, Belgium);
Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v. Palumbo, 1987 E.C.R. 4861, [1989] 1 CEC
(CCH) 504 (1987) (preliminary ruling requested by the Corte Suprema di Cassazione
[Supreme Court], Rome, Italy); Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663,
1 C.M.L.R. 220 (1985) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court],
Netherlands); Case 34/82, Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse
Aannemers Vereniging, 1983 E.C.R. 987, 2 C.M.L.R. 605 (1984) (preliminary ruling
requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands); Case 814/79, Netherlands v.
Ruffer, 1980 E.C.R. 3807, 3 C.M.L.R. 293 (1981) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge
Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands); Case 133/78, Gourdain v. Nadler, 1979 E.C.R. 733,
3 C.M.L.R. 180 (1979) (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme
Court], Germany); Case 33/78, Somafer S.A. v. Saar-Ferngas A.G., 1978 E.C.R. 2183, 1
C.M.L.R. 490 (1979) (preliminary ruling requested by the Oberlandesgericht [Court of
Appeal], Saarbriicken, Germany); Case 150/77, Socidtd Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, 1978
E.C.R. 1431, 3 C.M.L.R. 499 (1978) (preliminary ruling requested by the Cour de Cassation
[Supreme Court], France); Case 43/77, Industrial Diamond Supplies v. Riva, 1977 E.C.R.
2175, 1 C.M.L.R. 349 (1978) (preliminary ruling requested by the Rechtbank van Eerste
Aanleg [Court of First Instance], Antwerp, Belgium).
77. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 1; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 1. The provision reads in part: "This
Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or
tribunal." Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1 (emphasis added). As to the
highlighted portion of this provision, one writer observes, "If the cause of action arises from
a civil or commercial matter, the legal characterisation of the rendering court is immaterial.
The court can be civil, commercial, administrative or criminal." Bartlett, supra note 6, at
48 (footnotes omitted). The European Court of Justice has explained that this provision
serves to emphasize that the term "civil and commercial matters" cannot be interpreted
solely by reference to the court in which the judgment was rendered or to the division of
jurisdiction among the courts in certain Member States. Gourdain, 1979 E.C.R. at 743, 3
C.M.L.R. at 195-96 (1979). See generally BYRNE, supra note 4, at 10-14.
78. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 1; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 1. On the enumerated exceptions to
the scope of the applicability of the Brussels Convention, see infra part III.A.2; see also
infra part IV.B (exceptions to the general rule of automatic recognition).
79. The Brussels Convention is said to apply automatically or directly. That is, the
courts of Member States must apply the Brussels Convention whenever the Convention
obtains; it is irrelevant that the parties do not raise the Convention in their pleadings. 1979
Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 8-9; Kohler, supra note 2, at 575. For a discussion of the
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Conversely, a judgment that falls outside of the scope of the Convention
- that is, a judgment not "civil or commercial" within the meaning of
the Brussels Convention - need not necessarily be recognized or given
effect.8" Therefore, the determination of whether a judgment is civil or
commercial is a crucial one since it may well be dispositive of the
judgment's enforceability.
Unfortunately, the Brussels Convention does not define "civil or
commercial."'" There exists some uncertainty as to the meaning of this
phrase and hence, to the proper ambit of the Convention.82 T.C. Hartley
observes:
What is a civil or commercial matter? This concept may not be very
familiar to English lawyers but on the Continent the existence of these
separate court systems necessitates the recognition of such an idea since
the rules for deciding which court has jurisdiction in a particular case
usually depend, in principle, on a concept of this nature. In essence a
civil or commercial matter is an ordinary private law matter; it is not a
criminal or public law matter. Thus, for example, fiscal and administra-
tive cases would be excluded.
The general concept is fairly clear and well established in the legal
systems of at least the Continental Member States of the Community.
There is, however, no general consensus as to the detailed application of
the principle and this varies from country to country. Consequently it
could happen that a matter which was regarded as civil under the rules
in force in Country A would not be so regarded under the rules in force
in Country B. How should one decide whether a judgment relating to
such a matter comes within the scope of the Convention? Should one
look to the classification of the judgment-granting state or to that of the
judgment-recognising state?83
automatic application of the Convention, see infra part IV.A.
80. The State may still recognize and enforce such a judgment, but the Brussels
Convention would not necessitate such recognition and enforcement. Nor does the Brussels
Convention vitiate the applicability of the bilateral recognition conventions that predate the
Brussels Convention with respect to matters not covered by the Convention. Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 56; Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 56;
Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 56; Joined Cases 9 & 10/77, Bavaria Fluggesell-
schaft Schwabe & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, 1977 E.C.R. 1517, 1 C.M.L.R. 566 (1980)
(preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], Germany).
81. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 9.
82. Hartley, supra note 11, at 106-09; see also Freeman, supra note 12, at 499-503;
Winifred M. Hauschild, The Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, in COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
IN EUROPE 51, 54-55 (R.M. Goode & K.R. Simmonds eds., 1978); Christian Kohler, The
Case Law of the European Court on the Judgments Convention-Part 11, 7 EUR. L. REV.
103, 103-05 (1982).
83. Hartley, supra note 11, at 106.
Summer 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
As Hartley illustrates, to adopt the meaning given the phrase "civil and
commercial" by the various Member States would lead to inconsistent
application of the Brussels Convention. Such a result would likely be
contrary to the intention of the drafters of the Convention, who hoped to
"facilitate recognition and to introduce an expeditious procedure for
securing the enforcement of judgments. 84  Varied and multiform
interpretation of a matter as important as the scope of the Convention
would doubtless frustrate this objective.
The European Court of Justice, recognizing the difficulties that would
flow from parochial interpretation of the scope of the Brussels Conven-
tion, determined in the 1976 Eurocontrol decision that the phrase "civil
and commercial" is to be afforded a Community definition independent
of Member State law. 5 In that case, the Oberlandesgericht of DUsseldorf
asked the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the
interpretation of the term "commercial and civil. '86 Eurocontrol, an
international public organization established by treaty which provides
certain air navigation safety services in Western Europe, brought suit in
the Brussels Tribunal de Commerce against LTU, a German air transport
firm, to recover unpaid charges from LTU for the use of Eurocontrol
services. 88 LTU argued unsuccessfully before the Belgian court that the
matter was one of public law, not commercial law, and that the matter
could not be brought before a commercial court such as the Tribunal de
Commerce.89 The Belgian court, however, deemed the matter commercial
and ruled in favor of Eurocontrol. 90 Eurocontrol then sought enforcement
in Germany, where the matter eventually came before the Oberlandesge-
richt in Diisseldorf.9" The German court was uncertain whether the
matter was in fact commercial and within the scope of the Brussels
Convention, and so referred the question to the European Court of
84. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, pmbl.; see also Brussels Convention,
supra note 1, pmbl.
85. Case 29/76, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, 1976
E.C.R. 1541, 1552, 1 C.M.L.R. 88, 102 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by the
Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Disseldorf, Germany). The Eurocontrol case was one
of the first decisions rendered by the Court of Justice pursuant to its authority to interpret
the Brussels Convention under the 1971 Interpretation Protocol. See supra part I.B.
86. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. at 1542, 1 C.M.L.R. at 90.
87. Id. at 1553, 1 C.M.L.R. at 90.
88. Id., I C.M.L.R. at 91.
89. Id. at 1543, 1 C.M.L.R. at 89.
90. Id., 1 C.M.L.R. at 89.
91. Id., 1 C.M.L.R. at 90.
92. Id., 1 C.M.L.R. at 90.
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Justice for a preliminary ruling under the 1971 Interpretation Protocol.93
The European Court's decision in Eurocontrol addressed the issue of
whether the phrase "civil and commercial" should be determined by
reference to the law of the State where the judgment was rendered or the
State where the judgment was to be enforced. The Court held that the
laws of neither State should control, writing:
In the interpretation of the concept "civil and commercial matters" for
the purposes of the application of the [Brussels] Convention ...
reference must not be made to the law of one of the States concerned
but, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Convention and, secondly,
to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national
legal systems.94
The Eurocontrol Court thus held that for purposes of determining the
scope of the Brussels Convention, the phrase "civil and commercial
matters" is to be afforded an independent Community definition.
According to the Court, the purpose of this rule was to ensure the
uniform application of the Brussels Convention to parties existing in
diverse legal systems.95
93. Id., 1 C.M.L.R. at 90.
94. Id. at 1552, 1 C.M.L.R. at 102; see also Case 814/79, Netherlands v. Rtiffer, 1980
E.C.R. 3807, 3 C.M.L.R. 293 (1981) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad
[Supreme Court], Netherlands); Case 133/78, Gourdain v. Nadler, 1979 E.C.R. 733, 3
C.M.L.R. 180 (1979) (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme
Court], Germany).
95. The Court held:
Since Article 1 serves to indicate the area of application of the Convention it is
necessary, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which
derive from it for the Contracting States and the persons to whom it applies are equal
and uniform, that the terms of that provision should not be interpreted as a mere
reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned.
Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. at 1551, 1 C.M.L.R. at 100. One observer notes that this
language "illustrates once again the Court's consistent efforts generally to avoid a simple
renvoi to national law of provisions of Community Law or of Community origin." A.
McClellan, The Convention of Brussels of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 15 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 228, 230 (1978). Another commentator points out that this approach is
similar to the way in which the European Court reconciles Community documents drafted
in several languages. Kohler, supra note 2, at 565-66. The Court has found that "[tihe
different language versions of a Community text must be given a uniform interpretation and
hence in the case of divergence between the versions the provision in question must be
interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms
a part." Case 30/77, Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 1999, 2010, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8441, at 7956 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by
the Magistrates' Court, London, England); see also Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH
v. Jacqmain, 1981 E.C.R. 1671, 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1982) (preliminary ruling requested by the
Hof van Cassatie [Supreme Court], Belgium) (selecting an interpretation that was "more in
keeping with the objectives and spirit of the Convention"). Recall that the different
language versions of the Brussels Convention are all valid under article 68. See supra note
19.
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The European Court of Justice in Eurocontrol held somewhat
cryptically that in the interpretation of the phrase "civil and commercial,"
reference must be made primarily "to the objectives and scheme of the
Convention." 96 These objectives include
the overall aim of the Convention to strengthen the legal protection of
persons established in the Community, through the rationalisation,
concentration and unification of jurisdiction of Contracting States' courts
and consequent simplification and facilitation of procedures for
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of Community courts' judg-
ments.97
The Court, applying this new standard, found that Eurocontrol's claim
against LTU was not commercial and was therefore not within the scope
of the Brussels Convention.98 Accordingly, the judgment obtained by
Eurocontrol could not be enforced in Germany under the Brussels
Convention.
Curiously missing from the decision of the European Court of Justice
in Eurocontrol is any consideration of whether the enforcement court is
bound by the rendering court's characterization of the matter as civil or
commercial, absent reference to the European Court. Kaye examines this
matter in some depth, concluding:
(a) first, that there is no express basis in the Convention for holding that
enforcement-courts are bound by decisions of judgment-courts as to civil
and commercial nature of proceedings, leading to the judgment sought
96. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. at 1552, 1 C.M.L.R. at 101.
97. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 64-65; see also Brussels Convention,
supra note 1, pmbl.
98. The Court found that the public nature of Eurocontrol, acting in its capacity as a
public authority, rendered its claim against LTU a public claim, not a commercial matter
under article 1 of the Brussels Convention. The Court held that "a judgment given in an
action between a public authority and a person governed by private law, in which a public
authority has acted in the exercise of its powers, is excluded from the area of application
of the Convention." Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. at 1552, 1 C.M.L.R. at 102. This holding
is applicable only to public entities qua public entities - had Eurocontrol been acting as
a private entity, the Brussels Convention would have applied.
In 1980, the European Court affirmed the reasoning of its earlier decision in
Eurocontrol, finding that where a public authority is acting within the scope of its powers
as a public authority, the Convention is inapplicable. Case 814/79, Netherlands v. Rtiffer,
1980 E.C.R. 3807, 3 C.M.L.R. 293 (1981) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad
[Supreme Court], Netherlands). Riiffer concerned the removal of a wreck in a public
waterway by a public authority, pursuant to an international obligation. The Court observed
that certain judgments in an action involving a public authority may come within the
purview of the Convention, but that this would not include actions in which the public
authority is acting as such.
The Court's holdings in Eurocontrol and Riiffer illustrate that the scope of the Brussels
Convention is limited to matters of private law and does not extend to matters of public law.
While the public/private law distinction may be unfamiliar to those from common law
systems, the concept is not new to practitioners of civil law, which includes most lawyers
in Continental Europe.
[Vol. 14:559
Judgments in the European Community
to be enforced...; and
(b) secondly, that there are, nonetheless, strong and binding reasons of
Convention policy, as consistently laid down by the European Court, for
Contracting States' enforcement-courts to regard themselves as being
under a duty to adopt a Community meaning of civil and commercial in
relation to the facts of the particular case, which is consistent with the
decision reached by the foreign judgment-court itself thereupon, where
the latter's finding in this respect was both express and at least
defensible and the enforcement-court has no serious reasons for doubting
its correctness .... Thus, only when the judgment-court's decision is
felt to be wholly unjustified, or is not expressed or at least evident,
should the enforcement-court itself consider departing from the
judgment-court's finding, or, as the case may be, reaching its conclusion
independently, as to civil and commercial. 99
Put simply, the enforcement court should not substitute its own opinion
for that of the judgment court as to whether the matter is civil or
commercial. When, however, there is a genuine dispute as to the
characterization of the matter, the enforcement court ought to refer the
question to the European Court of Justice.
2. Specific Exclusions From Scope
The Brussels Convention expressly exempts from the scope of the
agreement four fields of law. Pursuant to article 1, the Brussels
Convention shall not apply to:
1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property
arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions
and analogous proceedings;
3. social security;
4. arbitration.' I°
A subsequent amendment to the Brussels Convention added the provision
that it "shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administra-
tive matters.' '01
99. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 1347-48 (footnotes omitted). Kaye
indicates that these principles apply with special force "where the judgment-court has held
proceedings not to be civil and commercial within Article 1 of the Convention, not merely
where it has held them to be so." Id. at 1348.
100. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 1; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
101. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1. This provision was added by
the 1978 Accession Convention. Id. art. 1 n.l.
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Ideally, the Brussels Convention would have applied to all civil and
commercial matters. But, under the disparate state of European law and
policy, the drafters of the Convention saw fit to exempt from coverage
these categories of cases."° Nevertheless, in doing so, the drafters
adopted exclusionary rather than permissive language, believing that this
approach would afford the Convention the broadest possible scope.
03
Had the drafters undertaken to define in positive terms the scope of the
Convention, all matters not so described would fall outside the Conven-
tion's ambit. As drafted, the Convention applies to all civil and
commercial matters unless specifically excluded. In this manner, the
reach of the Convention is extended as far as possible, increasing with it
the degree of European social and economic integration."
The four exceptions listed in article I must be interpreted in light of
the decision of the European Court in the Eurocontrol case,0" discussed
above. 1°6 That is, each exception must be afforded an independent
Community interpretation based primarily upon "the objectives and
scheme of the Convention" and not upon the laws of either the State
where the judgment was rendered or the State where the judgment is to
be enforced.'17
The four exceptions obtain only when the matter concerned is the
principle element of the case. Jenard observes that "matters falling
outside the scope of the Convention do so only if they constitute the
principal subject-matter of the proceedings. They are thus not excluded
when they come before the court as a subsidiary matter either in the main
proceedings or in preliminary proceedings."' 1 8 The European Court of
Justice held in the De Cavel II decision that "[a]ncillary claims ... come
within the scope of the Convention according to the subject-matter with
which they are concerned and not according to the subject-matter
involved in the principal claim."' 9 Moreover, the Court has found no
102. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 10.
103. Id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 6, at 48-49.
104. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 84.
105. Case 29/76, LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol,
1976 E.C.R. 1541, 1 C.M.L.R. 88 (1976) (preliminary ruling requested by the Oberlandes-
gericht [Court of Appeal], Dilsseldorf, Germany).
106. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
107. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. at 1552, 1 C.M.L.R. at 101; see also KAYE, CIVIL
JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 85.
108. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 10; see also KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION,
supra note 4, at 151-53; Bartlett, supra note 6, at 48. Problems arise, however, in
determining whether an issue is principal or ancillary. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra
note 4, at 152; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 14.
109. Case 120/79, De Cavel v. De Cavel, 1980 E.C.R. 731, 741, 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 6
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legal basis for drawing a distinction between interim and final measures,
and whether an interim measure falls within the Convention's scope
depends upon its nature.10
a. Exclusion of matters concerning the status or legal
capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out
of a matrimonial relationship, and wills and succession
Article 1(1) of the Brussels Convention exempts from coverage all
matters concerning "the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights
in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, Wills and succes-
sion."'"' The Committee of Experts responsible for drafting the Brussels
Convention excluded these matters because "there was such disparity on
these matters between the various systems of law [of the Member
States]."" 2 This disparity would be troublesome in light of the principle
of automatic recognition set out in the Convention;" 3 the judge of one
State would be wary of enforcing a foreign judgment rendered under law
that is at odds with the law of his own State."4 Rather than risk
disruption of the Convention's effectiveness, the Committee excluded
such matters altogether."5
(1980) (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], Germany)
[hereinafter De Cavel II]. The Court observed:
In so far as its field of application is concerned, no provision of the Convention links
the treatment of ancillary claims to the treatment of principal claims. On the contrary,
various provisions confirm that the Convention does not link the treatment of claims
classified as "ancillary" to the treatment of the principal claim....
These provisions demonstrate unequivocally that the general scheme of the Convention
does not necessarily link the treatment of an ancillary claim to that of a principal
claim....
Ancillary claims accordingly come within the scope of the Convention according to the
subject-matter with which they are concerned and not according to the subject-matter
involved in the principal claim.
Id. at 740, 3 C.M.L.R. at 6.
110. Id. at 741, 3 C.M.L.R. at 6.
111. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1(1). This provision remains
unaltered by subsequent revisions.
112. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 10.
113. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 26; Convention Consolidated Text,
supra note 1, art. 26; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 26.
114. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 10 (citing as an example the differences in
the divorce laws of the various Member States). Hartley observes:
The matters . . . are probably excluded because they are personal matters in which
questions of public policy, morality and social philosophy are likely to be important.
Consequently, judges would be unwilling to depart from their own national conceptions
and would therefore find it difficult to accept the principle of automatic recognition of
foreign judgments.
Hartley, supra note 11, at 108.
115. Jenard reports that if these matters had been included, "it would have been
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i. Status or legal capacity
The first subject of the article 1(1) exclusion is "the status or legal
capacity of natural persons."' 6  Within the meaning of the Brussels
Convention, matters concerning "the status or legal capacity of natural
persons" involve the following:
- the voidability and nullity of marriages, and judicial separation,
- the dissolution of marriages,
- the death of a person,
- the status and legal capacity of a minor and the legal representation
of a person who is mentally ill; the status and legal capacity of a minor
also includes judgments on the right to custody after the divorce or legal
separation of the parents ....
- the nationality or domicile ... of a person,
- the care, custody and control of children, irrespective of whether
these are in issue in divorce, guardianship, or other proceedings,
- the adoption of children."I7
This catalogue, provided by the rapporteur of the 1978 Accession
Convention to the Brussels Convention,"' should not be taken as an
exclusive listing of matters falling within the purview of article 1(1). 19
Note, however, that this provision applies only to natural persons. 20
ii. Property rights arising from marriage
Judgments concerning the "rights in property arising out of a
matrimonial relationship" are also exempted from enforceability under the
Brussels Convention.'21 Such matters were excluded because of the great
divergences between the legal systems of European States with regard to
property rights arising out of a marital relationship. 22 Additionally, there
difficult [for the enforcement-State] not to re-examine the rules of jurisdiction at the
enforcement stage. This in turn would have meant changing the nature of the Convention
and making it much less effective." 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 10; see also
KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 85-86.
116. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
117. 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29, at 89.
118. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
119. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 87.
120. See Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
121. Id.
122. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 11; see also Kohler, supra note 82, at 105
("[T]he differences between the laws of the Member States... was one of the basic reasons
for excluding [these matters] from the scope of the Convention. ... ).
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are "very marked divergences between the rules of conflict of laws [in
this regard], and this provokes positive conflicts between the systems."'' 23
In light of the disparity in the laws of the various Member States, the
European Court of Justice established a uniform definition of "rights in
property arising out of a marital relationship" within the'meaning of the
Brussels Convention. In its 1979 decision in the De Cavel I case, the
Court held:
The enforced settlement on a provisional basis of proprietary legal
relationships between spouses in the course of proceedings for divorce
is closely linked to the grounds for the divorce and the personal situation
of the spouses or any children of the marriage and is, for that reason,
inseparable from questions relating to the status of persons raised by the
dissolution of the matrimonial relationship and from the settlement of
rights in property arising out of the matrimonial relationship. Conse-
quently, the term "rights in property arising out of a marital relation-
ship" includes not only property arrangements specifically and exclu-
sively envisaged by certain national legal systems in the case of
marriage but also any proprietary relationships resulting directly from the
matrimonial relationship or the dissolution thereof.' 24
This independent definition is consistent with the Court's general
preference for establishing an independent Community-wide construction
of Convention terminology.
25
As the Court indicates, this exception applies only to rights in
property that arise "directly" out of a marital relationship or the
dissolution thereof. 126 The exclusion does not automatically preclude
enforcement of judgments rendered in any action involving a husband and
wife. If, for example, "the claim of a spouse subsists in the law of
contract, in tort or in the law of property independently of the matri-
123. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 11.
124. Case 143/78, De Cavel v. De Cavel, 1979 E.C.R. 1055, 1066, 2 C.M.L.R. 547,
558 (1979) (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court],
Germany) [hereinafter De Cavel 1].
125. See supra notes 85-98 (discussing the Eurocontrol case).
126. De Cavel 1, 1979 E.C.R. at 1068, 2 C.M.L.R. at 560. As discussed supra at note
109, the De Cavel II Court ruled that matters that are ancillary to a principal claim may
nevertheless fall within the scope of the Brussels Convention, even if the principal claim
does not. The Court found that an application in the course of a divorce proceeding for an
order placing assets under seal fell outside the scope of the Convention - not because it
concerned an ancillary matter, but because it concerned rights in property arising from the
parties' matrimonial relationship. See Case 25/81, C.H.W. v. G.J.H., 1982 E.C.R. 1189, 2
C.M.L.R. 667 (1984) ("An application for provisional measures to secure the delivery up
of a document in order to prevent it from being used as evidence in an action concerning
a husband's management of his wife's property does not fall within the scope of the
[Brussels Convention] if such management is closely connected with the proprietary
relationship resulting directly from the marriage bond.").
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monial regime, the [Brussels] Convention will apply."' 27 But despite the
illumination by the Court of the phrase "rights in property arising out of
a matrimonial relationship," there remains considerable uncertainty as to
the application of this particular exclusion.'28
iii. Wills and succession
Article 1(1) of the Brussels Convention also exempts matters
concerning wills and succession. 2 9 Here again, the primary reason for
exclusion was the disparate treatment of succession matters in the
Member States. 3° The rapporteur of the 1978 Accession Convention
discusses the scope of this exemption:
The expression "wills and succession" covers all claims to testate or
intestate succession to an estate. It includes disputes as to the validity
or interpretation of the terms of a will setting up a trust, even where the
trust takes effect on a date subsequent to the death of the testator. The
same applies to proceedings in respect of the application and interpreta-
tion of statutory provisions establishing trusts in favour of persons or
institutions as a result of a person dying intestate. The [Brussels]
Convention does not, therefore, apply to any disputes concerning the
creation, interpretation and administration of trusts arising under the law
of succession including wills. On the other hand, disputes concerning
the relations of the trustee with persons other than beneficiaries, in other
words the "external relations" of the trust, come within the scope of the
[Brussels] Convention . . . ."
b. Exclusion of matters concerning bankruptcy, proceedings
relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or
other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions
and analogous proceedings
The second subject-matter exclusion, set out in article 1(2) of the
Brussels Convention, exempts matters of "bankruptcy, proceedings
relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons,
judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings."'3
127. Hauschild, supra note 82, at 55.
128. Id.; KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 89. For an extended treatment
of the marital exception, see id. at 89-117; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 15-19.
129. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. l(1).
130. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 11.
131. 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29, at 89.
132. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1(2); see also Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. The European Court of Justice has observed:
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Judgments obtained in such proceedings are not enforceable under the
Brussels Convention.
133
The Committee of Experts responsible for drafting the Brussels
Convention believed that "the peculiarities of this branch of law re-
quire[d] special rules.' 34 Accordingly, the Committee left enforcement
of bankruptcy and similar judgments to a separate convention drafted at
the same time as the Brussels Convention. 135 The Brussels Convention
and the draft bankruptcy convention were "intended to dovetail almost
completely with each other."'
' 36
Jenard reports that the article 1(2) bankruptcy exemption refers to
those proceedings which, depending on the system of law involved, are
based on the suspension of payments, the insolvency of the debtor or his
inability to raise credit, and which involve the judicial authorities for the
purpose either of compulsory and collective liquidation of the assets or
simply of supervision.' 37
The exemption applies to proceedings concerning legal persons as well
as natural persons.
13
c. Exclusion of matters concerning social security
Article 1(3) of the Brussels Convention provides that judgments
relating to social security are unenforceable under the Convention. 139 The
As far as concerns bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous
proceedings, according to the various laws of the Contracting Parties relating to debtors
who have declared themselves unable to meet their liabilities, insolvency or the
collapse of the debtor's creditworthiness, which involve the intervention of the courts
culminating in the compulsory "liquidation des biens" in the interest of the general
body of creditors of the person, firm or company, or at least in supervision by the
courts, it is necessary, if decisions relating to bankruptcy and winding-up are to be
excluded from the scope of the Convention, that they must derive directly from the
bankruptcy or winding-up and be closely connected with the proceedings for the
"liquidation des biens" or the "r~glement judiciaire."
Case 13378, Gourdain v. Nadler, 1979 E.C.R. 733, 744, 3 C.M.L.R. 180, 196 (1979)
(preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], Germany)
(emphasis added).
133. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
134. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 11; 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29,
at 89.
135. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 11; 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29,
at 89.
136. 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29, at 90.
137. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 11-12.
138. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. For an extended discussion of the
bankruptcy exemption, see KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 129-44; BYRNE,
supra note 4, at 19-21.
139. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3).
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Committee of Experts responsible for the draft Brussels Convention
excluded such matters because "[i]n some countries ... social security is
a matter of public law, and in others it falls in the borderline area
between private law and public law."'40 The Committee also expressed
concern over possible interference "on matters of social security between
the Convention and agreements already concluded, whether bilaterally or
under the auspices of other international organizations such as the
International Labour Organization or the Council of Europe."'
141
The Brussels Convention does not define "social security." The
Convention rapporteur, however, indicates that social security signifies at
least the following benefits: "medical care, sickness benefits, maternity
allowances, invalidity benefits, old age and survivors' pensions, benefits
for accidents at work and occupational diseases, family allowances and
unemployment benefits."' 42 In any event, the exemption is confined to
disputes arising from relationships between the administrative authorities
concerned and employers or employees. On the other hand, the
Convention is applicable when the authority concerned relies on a right
of direct recourse against a third party responsible for injury or damage,
or is subrogated as against a third party to the rights of the injured party
insured by it, since, in doing so, it is acting in accordance with the
ordinary legal rules.
143
d. Exclusion of arbitration
The Brussels Convention, pursuant to article 1(4), does not apply to
arbitration.'" Several international agreements on arbitration were in
force prior to the Brussels Convention, and the Committee of Experts did
not see fit to add to this existing body of law. 145 Accordingly, arbitral
awards are not enforceable under the Brussels Convention.'" The
European Court of Justice recently held that the article 1(4) exclusion is
applicable to litigation in a State court as concerns the appointment of an
arbitrator, even where a preliminary question in such litigation is whether
140. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 12.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 13; see also 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29, at 92. On the social
security exemption, see KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 144-46; BYRNE, supra
note 4, at 21-22.
144. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(4). On the arbitration exception, see
KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 146-50; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 22.
145. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 13.
146. Id.
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there exists an enforceable arbitration agreement. 47
IV. RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS
Recognition of a judgment is distinct from enforcement of a
judgment. Recognition is the judicial acceptance by one forum of a
judgment rendered by another forum. Enforcement occurs when a
judicial forum orders compliance with a judgment rendered by it or by
another forum. Recognition therefore is a prerequisite to enforcement; a
judgment must be recognized before it may be enforced, although a court
may recognize a judgment without enforcing it.148  The Brussels
Convention provides for both the recognition and the enforcement of
foreign judgments.
A. General Rule of Automatic Recognition
If a judgment given in one Member State is found to be "civil or
commercial" within the meaning of the Brussels Convention, 149 and the
subject matter of the judgment is not exempted from coverage pursuant
to article 1,150 then the judgment shall be recognized in other Member
States without any special procedure being required. 5' Under article 26
of the Brussels Convention, the foreign judgment is deemed to be
recognized "automatically.' 52 That is, the Convention "does not require
147. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. SocietA Italiana Impianti P.A. (E.C.J.
July 25, 1991) (LEXIS, Europe Library, Cases File). On this decision, see Wolfram Krohn,
Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. SocietA Italiana Impianti P.A., 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (1992).
Previously, there had been some uncertainty on this score. See 1979 Schlosser Report,
supra note 29, at 92-93; KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 14.
148. Hartley observes:
The recognition of a foreign judgment takes place when the recognising court accepts
as binding the determination of the rights and duties of the parties contained in the
judgment. Enforcement takes place when the court obliges the defendant, if necessary
by coercion, to obey the judgment. Consequently a judgment cannot be enforced
unless it is first recognised; but it may be recognised without being enforced.
Hartley, supra note 11, at 105; see also LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 312.
149. See supra part III.A.1.
150. See supra part III.A.2.
151. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 26; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 26; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 26.
152. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 43. One writer observes:
The Convention is different from traditional treaties on the recognition and enforcement
of judgments. Usually, those treaties contain only "indirect rules" (e.g. rules imposing
recognition or enforcement provided that certain grounds for assuming jurisdiction have
been adopted by the foreign court). However, a convention with "direct rules" dictates
common grounds for jurisdiction among the contracting States; subsequent recognition
or enforcement abroad of judgments rendered in conformity with such common
grounds are, therefore, subject to a few exceptions, automatic.
Giardina, supra note 19, at 263 n.3; see also Bartlett, supra note 6, at 56 ("Articles 5
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a judicial decision in the State in which recognition is sought to enable
the party in whose favour judgment has been given to invoke that
judgment against any party concerned."'' 53  A judgment recognized
pursuant to article 26 should in principle have the same authority as if it
were rendered in the State where enforcement is sought. m
The Brussels Convention applies only to "judgments," which the
Convention defines as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "judgment" means any judgment
given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State, whatever the
judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of
execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer
of the court.
155
The Convention therefore is not limited to the enforcement of "judg-
ment[s] terminating the proceedings before the court, but also applies to
provisional court orders,"'' 56 including interlocutory court decisions. 57
The European Court of Justice has, however, determined that ex parte
proceedings are not entitled to recognition and enforcement under the
Brussels Convention. 5' Hence, provisional or interlocutory orders may
be recognized and enforced only if granted after a "proper hearing."'' 59
B. Exceptions to Recognition
A court may refuse to recognize a foreign judgment under the
Brussels Convention in five situations. Article 27 provides:
through 30 set forth uniform rules of recognition based on the rebuttable presumption that
all judgments are to be recognised and enforced without requiring special proceedings.");
Kohler, supra note 2, at 575.
153. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 43.
154. Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494
(1988) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands).
155. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 25; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 25; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 25. See generally BYRNE,
supra note 4, at 104-05. Note that the Convention is also applicable to authentic instru-
ments and court settlements. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, arts. 50-51; see also
infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text; DASHWOOD ET AL., supra note 4, at 36-37.
156. 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29, at 126.
157. Id.
158. Case 125/79, Denilauler v. S.N.C. Couchet Fr~res, 1980 E.C.R. 1553, 1 C.M.L.R.
62 (1981) (preliminary ruling requested by the Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal],
Frankfurt am Main, Germany). Note, however, that article 24 provides: "Application may
be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provisional, including protective,
measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention,
the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter."
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 24; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art.
24; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 24.
159. Kohler, supra note 2, at 576.
(Vol. 14:559
Summer 1993] Judgments in the European Community
A judgment shall not be recognized:
1. if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which
recognition is sought;
2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not
duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with
an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for
his defence;
3. if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute
between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought;
4. if the court of the State of origin, in order to arrive at its judgment,
has decided a preliminary question concerning the status or legal
capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matri-
monial relationship, wills or succession in a way that conflicts with a
rule of the private international law of the State in which the recognition
is sought, unless the same result would have been reached by the
application of the rules of private international law of that State;
5. if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in a
non-Contracting State involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties, provided that this latter judgment fulfils the conditions
necessary for its recognition in the State addressed.
16
Point 4 mirrors the exemptions set forth in article 1(1).161 The provision
is therefore redundant and need not be discussed again here. 62 The
remaining provisions concern public policy, the rights of the defendant,
and irreconcilable judgments. These exceptions are discussed in turn
below.
1. Public Policy
The public policy exception set out in article 27(1) provides an
"escape clause" for reviewing courts in cases that touch upon the matters
of grave domestic concern.' 63 The Committee of Experts responsible for
the draft Convention considered that the public policy exception was to
operate in exceptional cases only. 64 The European Court of Justice,
160. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 27; see also Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 27; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 27. Subpara-
graphs 2 and 5 were modified by the 1978 Accession Convention, and subparagraphs 4 and
5 were modified by the 1989 San Sebastian Convention. See Convention Consolidated Text,
supra note 1, art. 27 nn.1-3.
161. See Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 1(1). On article 27(4), see
KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 1492-97.
162. Kaye suggests the provision be removed. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note
4, at 1497.
163. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
164. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 44; see also Bartlett, supra note 6, at 57.
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consistent with this opinion, has construed the exception narrowly.t65 In
the Hoffiman case, the Court found that the incompatibility of a foreign
judgment with a domestic judgment does not implicate the general public
policy exception set out in point 1 of article 27.166 Rather, the issue is to
be resolved by recourse to the specific provision of point 3, quoted
above.167 Even so, there is some question as to whether under this
exception, a State may refuse to recognize a judgment obtained by
fraud. 16
8
2. Rights of the Defendant
Article 27(2) permits a Member State's courts to refuse to recognize
a judgment entered against a defendant in default without certain
procedural safeguards. 169  By its terms, the exception does not apply
where: (1) the defendant has been afforded adequate notice and (2) the
notice has been provided in a timely fashion. 170  The court in which
enforcement is sought has the responsibility of determining whether these
conditions have been met.' 17 Accordingly, a court may refuse recognition
where it determines that the conditions of article 27(2) are satisfied, even
though the rendering court deemed the defendant duly served.' 72  It
follows from this rule that article 27(2) may be applicable even where the
defendant was timely served under the laws of the State in which the
judgment was originally rendered, or where the defendant resided,
exclusively or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of such court or in the
165. Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645,668, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494,
505 (1988) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands);
see also Hartley, supra note 11, at 114; KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at
1438-44. On the public policy exception, see id. at 1437-49; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 108;
LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 299-301; DASHWOOD ET AL., supra note 4, at 39-40;
Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 264-66.
166. Hoffman, 1988 E.C.R. at 668-69, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) at 505.
167. Id., [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) at 505.
168. 1979 Schlosser Report, supra note 29, at 128; KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra
note 4, at 1444-49.
169. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 27(2); Convention Consolidated Text,
supra note 1, art. 27(2); Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 27(2).
170. See 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 44. On the article 27(2) exception, see
KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 1449-70; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 108-13;
LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 301-07; DASHWOOD ET AL., supra note 4, at 40-41.
171. Article 27(2) is addressed only to the court in which enforcement is sought. Case
166/80, Klomps v. Michel, 1981 E.C.R. 1593, 2 C.M.L.R. 773 (1982) (preliminary ruling
requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands).
172. Case 228/81, Pendy Plastic Products B.V. v. Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft GmbH,
1982 E.C.R. 2723, 1 C.M.L.R. 665 (1983) (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundes-
gerichtshof [Supreme Court], Germany).
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State wherein such court is situated. 73
A court asked to enforce a judgment entered in default must therefore
independently review the circumstances in which the judgment was
rendered to determine whether recognition of the judgment is permissible
under article 27(2). In connection with this inquiry, the court must limit
its review to matters contained within article 27(2) and may therefore
deny recognition only if the defendant received untimely or inadequate
notice. 174  Article 27(2) requires that the reviewing court deny recogni-
tion where the defendant was not served with notice of the lawsuit in
sufficient time to allow him to respond and avoid entry of default. As
noted above, whether the notice was deemed timely under the law of the
State where the judgment was rendered is irrelevant - the reviewing
court must undertake an independent examination of the circumstances to
ensure that the notice was in fact timely as determined by reference to the
Brussels Convention. In making this inquiry, the reviewing court may
not demand proof that the defendant was actually aware of the notice. 
7 5
The European Court has determined that where the enforcement court
finds that the defendant has been timely served, the court may presume
that the defendant had a sufficient opportunity to prepare a defense. 176
The presumption that timely notice equals good notice is not irrebuttable,
however, and the enforcement court is entitled to consider any exception-
al circumstances that may render timely service of notice inadequate
under article 27(2). 77 The enforcement court, which is charged with
determining whether notice was served in a timely fashion, may consider
the following factors in determining whether the case under review is
exceptional: (1) the means by which service was effected; (2) the
relationship. between the plaintiff and the defendant; and (3) the steps
required of the defendant to prevent the entry of a default judgment. 78
173. Case 49/84, Debaecker v. Bouwman, 1985 E.C.R. 1779, 2 C.M.L.R. 400 (1986)
(reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands). The
Court has held that article 27(2) applies without regard to whether the parties reside in
different Member States or in the same Member State. Klomps, 1981 E.C.R. 1593, 2
C.M.L.R. 773.
174. In Debaecker, the Court noted, "It follows from the wording of Article 27 that the
courts of the Contracting State may refuse to recognize a judgment only on one of the
grounds expressly mentioned in that provision." 1985 E.C.R. at 1796, 2 C.M.L.R. at 418.
175. Klomps, 1981 E.C.R. at 1608, 2 C.M.L.R. at 796. Since article 27(2) is addressed
only to the court in which enforcement is sought, it is irrelevant for purposes of the Brussels
Convention that a court of the State in which the judgment was rendered has already
determined that the defendant was afforded timely notice. Id., 2 C.M.L.R. at 795.
176. Id., 2 C.M.L.R. at 796.
177. Id. at 1608-09, 2 C.M.L.R. at 796.
178. Id. at 1609, 2 C.M.L.R. at 796; accord Debaecker, 1985 E.C.R. 1779, 2 C.M.L.R.
400. In Debaecker, the Court held that conduct undertaken by a plaintiff following service
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Inadequacy of notice is the second ground for denying recognition of
a judgment obtained in default of appearance. In a recent decision, the
European Court of Justice ruled that recognition may not be given a
default judgment rendered against a defendant who was not properly
notified in accordance with the local law of the State where the defendant
is served.179 The European Court has also ruled that a judgment rendered
in default of appearance shall not be given recognition where the notice
of service is not in due form, even though it was timely served. 80 In the
Isabelle Lancray case, the Court noted that any issue raised by the
plaintiff's attempt to cure a defective service is governed by the law of
the State where the judgment was rendered or, where applicable, by
international agreement.' 8' Also, the Court of Justice has found that a
"document which instituted the proceedings" referred to in this provision
may be any document that, under the law of the State in which the
judgment is rendered, requires a defendant to make an appropriate
response and which in default thereof entitles a plaintiff to judgment.'8 2
3. Irreconcilable Judgments
A State court may refuse to recognize a judgment, pursuant to article
27(3), when it is "irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute
is an element which may be used to determine whether service was timely. The Court noted
that after a defendant has been served, the plaintiff is under no obligation to re-serve the
defendant after learning that the defendant has assumed a new address. Even so, the
plaintiff's re-service of the defendant ensures that the defendant's change of address cannot
be deemed an "exceptional circumstance" preventing a determination that the defendant was
timely served. The Court further noted that the enforcement court may consider the
defendant's responsibility for any failure of a duly served document to reach him.
179. Case C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH v. Brandeis, Ltd., _ E.C.R. _ (Nov. 12,
1992) (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court],
Germany), discussed in EUROWATCH, vol. 4, no. 18, Dec. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, AllNws File. Brandeis sought to execute in Germany a default judgment
rendered in England in connection with the repayment of a loan forwarded to Minalmet.
After Brandeis commenced suit in England, it attempted to serve Minalmet with a writ of
summons in Germany by forwarding the summons to the German authorities. The German
authorities attempted without success to serve the writ on Minalmet at the address indicated
and eventually left the writ at the local post office with a certificate that service had been
attempted. Under German law, such service was inadequate.
180. Case C-305/88, Isabelle Lancray SA v. Peters & Sickert KG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2725
(reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], Germany);
see also Pieri, supra note 2, at 553.
181. Isabelle Lancray, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-2740.
182. Klomps, 1981 E.C.R. 1593, 2 C.M.L.R. 773. In Klomps, the Court deemed a
payment order (Zahlungsbefehl) a "document" under article 27(2) since, under German law,
service of a payment order entitles a plaintiff to a default judgment where the defendant
fails to take appropriate responsive action.
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between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought.' 183
Although such a circumstance may well fall within the public policy
exception, 184 the Committee of Experts responsible for drafting the
Brussels Convention carved out a separate exception to obviate the
"danger that the concept of public policy would be interpreted too
widely."'' 8 5 The Court of Justice has ruled that "[i]n order to ascertain
whether the two judgments are irreconcilable within the meaning of
Article 27(3), it should be examined whether they entail legal conse-
quences that are mutually exclusive.' 8 6 In the case of an irreconcilable
conflict, "the local judgment in the recognising state will always prevail,
irrespective of which judgment was given first or which court was first
seized of the case."'
8 7
Under article 27(5), a Member State's court may refuse to recognize
a judgment that is irreconcilable with a judgment rendered earlier in a
non-Contracting State.188  This provision, which was added to the
183. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 27(3); Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 27(3); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 27(3).
184. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
185. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 45.
186. Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494
(1988) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands). In
Hoffman, the Court ruled:
23. It is apparent from the documents before the court that, in the present case, the
order for enforcement of the foreign maintenance order was issued at a time when the
national decree of divorce had already been granted and had acquired the force of res
judicata, and that the main proceedings are concerned with the period following the
divorce.
24. That being so, the judgments at issue have legal consequences which are mutually
exclusive. The foreign judgment, which necessarily presupposes the existence of the
matrimonial relationship, would have to be enforced although that relationship has been
dissolved by a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the state in
which enforcement is sought.
Id. at 669, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) at 505.
In a later decision, the Court noted that it was the purpose of the Convention to ensure
"the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings." Case C-
220/88, Dumez France & Tracoba v. Hessische Landesbank, 1990 E.C.R. 1-49 (reference for
a preliminary ruling from the Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], France). In this
connection, the Court noted:
In order to meet that objective, which is of fundamental importance in a convention
which has essentially to promote the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
States other than those in which they were delivered, it is necessary to avoid the
multiplication of courts of competent jurisdiction which would heighten the risk of
irreconcilable decisions, this being the reason for which recognition or an order for
enforcement is withheld by virtue of Article 27(3) of the Convention.
Id. at 1-80.
187. Hartley, supra note 11, at 116.
188. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 27(5); Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 27(5). On the article 27(5) exemption, see KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra
note 4, at 1495-1501; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 114; LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at
307-10; DASHWOOD ET AL., supra note 4, at 42.
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Brussels Convention as an amendment, removed the uncertainty as to
whether article 27(3) applied to judgments of the courts of States not
parties to the Brussels Convention.' 9 The article 27(5) exemption differs
from the article 27(3) exemption in two important aspects. First, pursuant
to article 27(5), the judgment of the non-Contracting State must have
preceded the judgment with which it conflicts; this limitation does not
apply to the article 27(3) exemption. Second, article 27(5) does not apply
unless the conflicting judgments concern the same cause of action, a
requirement inapplicable to the article 27(3) exemption.' 90
4. Special Exclusions
Apart from the exclusions set out in. article 27, the Brussels Con-
vention provides elsewhere that a court may not recognize a judgment
rendered by a foreign court under other special circumstances.' 9' In
particular, a court may not afford recognition to a judgment that does not
comport with the special rules set out in the Convention concerning the
following: (1) insurance matters; 192 (2) consumer contracts;' 93 (3)
exclusive jurisdiction;' 94 or (4) conventions with third States.'95
189. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 1498.
190. Id. at 1498-1500.
191. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 28; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 28; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 28.
192. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, tit. II § 3.
193. Id. tit. II § 4.
194. The Brussels Convention provides:
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile:
1. (a) in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property
or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Contracting State in which the
property is situated;(b) however, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immovable
property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive
months, the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled shall
also have jurisdiction, provided that the landlord and the tenant are natural persons and
are domiciled in the same Contracting State;
2. in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity
or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legalpersons, or the decisions of their organs, the courts of the Contracting State in which
the company, legal person or association has its seat;
3. in proceedings which have as their object the validity of entries in public registers,
the courts of the Contracting State in which the register is kept;
4. in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks,
designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the
Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has takenplace or is under the terms of an international convention deemed to have taken place;
5. in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the courts of the
Contracting State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 16; see also Brussels Convention, supra
note 1, art. 16; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 16.
195. Article 59 provides:
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C. Recognition Procedure
1. The Application for Recognition
A party seeking recognition of a foreign judgment pursuant to the
Brussels Convention must produce for the court of the State in which
recognition is sought an authentic copy of the foreign judgment. 9 6 The
Convention provides that the copy must "satisf[y] the conditions
necessary to establish its authenticity."'' 97 Although the Convention does
not specify the conditions necessary to establish the judgment's
authenticity, it is reasonable to assume that authenticity may be estab-
lished by whatever means are normally employed by the rendering court
to signify the authenticity of its decisions.'98
Where the party seeks recognition of a judgment entered in default,
the party must produce, in addition to an authenticated judgment, the
"original or a certified true copy of the document which establishes that
the party in default was served with the document instituting the
proceedings."' 99 The Convention further notes that if the party fails to
produce these documents, the court may "specify a time for their
production, accept equivalent documents or, if it considers that it has
This Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from assuming, in a convention
on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, an obligation towards a third State
not to recognize judgments given in other Contracting States against defendants
domiciled or habitually resident in the third State where, in cases provided for in
Article 4, the judgment could only be founded on a ground of jurisdiction specified in
the second paragraph of Article 3.
However, a Contracting State may not assume an obligation towards a third State not
to recognize a judgment given in another Contracting State by a court basing its
jurisdiction on the presence within that State of property belonging to the defendant,
or the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated there:
1. if the action is brought to assert or declare proprietary or possessory rights in that
property, seeks to obtain authority to dispose of it, or arises from another issue relating
to such property, or
2. if the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the subject-matter of the
action.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 59; see also Brussels Convention, supra
note 1, art. 59; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 59.
196. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 46; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 46; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 46.
197. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 46(1); Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 46(1); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 46.
198. The Brussels Convention provides, "No legalization or other similar formality shall
be required in respect of the documents referred to" in this article. Convention Consolidated
Text, supra note 1, art. 49.
199. Id. art. 46(2). This point was amended by the 1978 Accession Convention. Id.
art. 46 n.3.
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sufficient information before it, dispense with their production.", The
court may also order that these documents be translated by a certified
translator.2°'
2. Recognition of the Judgment
A party may seek recognition of a foreign judgment either as
incidental to any proceeding in which it is relevant or as a first step to
enforcement of such a judgment.202 The Brussels Convention does not
require the court to follow a special recognition process, 2 3 and the court
may resolve the issue of recognition under its own procedural rules. A
judgment may be given partial recognition. 2°4 Under no circumstances,
however, may the court review the substance of the judgment,25 and the
jurisdiction of the rendering court may only be reviewed in certain
exceptional cases. 2°6
3. Stay Pending Appeal
A stay of recognition is permissible where an ordinary appeal of the
judgment for which recognition is sought has been commenced in the
State where the judgment was rendered. 2 7 The European Court of Justice
has determined that an "ordinary appeal" within the meaning of this
provision is
any appeal which is such that it may result in the annulment or the
amendment of the judgment which is the subject matter of the pro-
200. Id. art. 48.
201. Id. It is unclear whether this provision, which refers to "documents specified in
Article[] 46(2)" (documents instituting a proceeding in an action resulting in default) also
applies to documents specified in point 1 of article 46 (authenticated copies of judgments).
202. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also LASOK & STONE, supra note
4, at 312.
203. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 26. Compare the absence of an
imposed recognition procedure with the elaborately detailed procedure applicable to the
enforcement of judgments. Id. tit. I11, ch. 2.
204. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
205. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 29; Case 42/76, De Wolf v. Harry Cox
B.V., 1976 E.C.R. 1760, 1767, 2 C.M.L.R. 43, 55 (1977) (preliminary ruling requested by
the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands); LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 293-94.
206. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 28; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 28; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 28. See generally LASOK & STONE,
supra note 4, at 295-99; Kohler, supra note 2, at 578-81.
207. Article 30 provides in part, "[a] court of a Contracting State in which recognition
is sought of a judgment given in another Contracting State may stay the proceedings if an
ordinary appeal against the judgment has been lodged." Convention Consolidated Text,
supra note 1, art. 30; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 30; see also Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 30; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 116-17.
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ceeding for recognition or enforcement under the Convention and the
lodging of which is bound, in the State in which the judgment was
given, to a period which is laid down by the law and starts to run by
virtue of that same judgment.208
The Court further noted that the recognition court need not stay pro-
ceedings "but merely has the power to do so. ''2°9 A special provision
applicable only to judgments rendered in the United Kingdom or Ireland
allows a court to stay proceedings "if enforcement is suspended in the
State of origin, by reason of an appeal.
210
V. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
A. General Rules
Pursuant to article 3 1, "[a] judgment given in a Contracting State and
enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another Contracting State
when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared
enforceable there."'211 Enforceability, therefore, consists of three elements.
208. Case 43/77, Industrial Diamond Supplies v. Riva, 1977 E.C.R. 2175, 2191-92, 1
C.M.L.R. 349, 367 (1978) (preliminary ruling requested by the Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg
[Court of First Instance], Antwerp, Belgium); see also LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at
314-15. Lasok and Stone note that "Article 30 should be construed as permitting a stay
where the time for an ordinary appeal has not yet expired and a party intends to lodge such
an appeal." Id. (citing 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 46-47).
209. Industrial Diamond, 1977 E.C.R. at 2189, 1 C.M.L.R. at 365. Once again, the
Court ruled that a Convention term - here, "ordinary appeal" - must be "defined solely
within the framework of the system of the Convention itself and not according to the law
either of the State in which the judgment was given or of the State in which recognition or
enforcement of that judgment is sought." Id. at 2190, 1 C.M.L.R. at 367.
210. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 30; see also Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 30; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 30. This
provision was added by the 1978 Accession Convention. Lasok and Stone observe that
"[tihis addition seems unnecessary; there appears to be no reason why the concept of
'ordinary appeal', as construed by the European Court, should produce special difficulties
in relation to British and Irish judgments . . . ." LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 315.
211. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 31; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 31; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 31. The text of article 31
previously read: "A judgment given in a Contracting State and enforceable in that State
shall be enforced in another Contracting State when, on the application of any interested
party, the order for its enforcement has been issued there." Brussels Convention, supra note
1, art. 31 (emphasis added). This provision was amended by the 1989 San Sebastian
Convention. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 31 n.4. On enforcement, see
KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 1423-45; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 117-44.
Under the Convention, the force of a judgment derives directly from the court in which
it was rendered. The European Court of Justice has ruled:
1. A foreign judgment which has been recognized by virtue of Article 26 of the
Convention must in principle have the same effects in the State in which enforcement
is sought as it does in the State in which the judgment was given;
2. A foreign judgment whose enforcement has been ordered in a Contracting State
pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention and which remains enforceable in the State
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First, the judgment must have been recognized in the Member State in
which enforcement is sought. Accordingly, a court may refuse to enforce
a judgment "if there is ground for refusing recognition. '' 2" That is, a
judgment is not enforceable if it falls within one of the four exclusions
discussed in Part IV.B. Second, the judgment must be enforceable in the
Member State in which it was rendered. This is an appropriate require-
ment, inasmuch as "no greater effect should be given a foreign judgment
than it possesses in the judgment-State itself.''21 3 Third, the interested
party must have made an application for enforcement to the appropriate
body.214
The Brussels Convention provides that the court to which application
for enforcement is made "shall give its decision without delay, 215 and
that the "appropriate officer of the court shall without delay bring the
decision given on the application to the notice of the applicant., 216 The
court may refuse to enforce the judgment only for those reasons set out
in the Convention and discussed above, 217 and "[u]nder no circumstances
may the foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance. '21" The law
in which it was given must not continue to be enforced in the State where enforcement
is sought when, under the law of the latter State, it ceases to be enforceable for reasons
which lie outside the scope of the Convention ....
Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645, 671, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494, 507
(1988) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands).
212. 1979 Jenard Report, supra note 13, at 47. See generally Bartlett, supra note 6,
at 58. As noted above, recognition is distinct from enforcement, and a party may seek to
have a judgment recognized even if it does not wish the judgment enforced. See supra note
148 and accompanying text.
213. KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 1429.
214. In most States, application is made to a civil court of first instance. See Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 32; Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 32(1);
Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 32(1). In Italy, however, application is made to an
intermediate appellate court. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 32(1). In
the United Kingdom, special provision is made for applications within England and Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Id. Lasok and Stone make the following point: "It...
appears that, for example, a Scottish decision which gives or refuses incidental recognition
to a French judgment has no binding effect in subsequent English proceedings for the
registration [i.e., enforcement] of the French judgment, but otherwise the Scottish judgment
has its normal effects in England." LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 312-13.
Article 32(2) provides that the proper local court of the Member State "shall be
determined by reference to the place of domicile of the party against whom enforcement is
sought." Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 32(2); Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 32(2); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 32; LASOK & STONE,
supra note 4, at 316.
215. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 34; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 34; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 34.
216. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 35; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 35; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 35.
217. See supra part IV.B.
218. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 34; Lugano Convention, supra
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of the State in which enforcement is sought determines the application
procedure. 2' 9 A party that has obtained a judgment in one State that is
amenable to enforcement in another State cannot commence a second
action in the other State for a judgment on the same terms against the
same party. 220 Finally, where an applicant obtained a judgment with the
assistance of legal aid in the rendering State, the applicant is entitled
under the Convention to legal aid in the State wherein enforcement is
sought.2
2
'
B. The Application for Enforcement
The application for enforcement must be accompanied by appropriate
documentation. 222 This includes an authenticated copy of the judgment
sought to be enforced,223 documents establishing that the judgment is
note 43, art. 34; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 34.
219. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 33; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 33; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 33; Case 148/84, Deutsche
Genossenschaftsbank v. SA Brasserie du Pcheur, 1985 E.C.R. 1981, 2 C.M.L.R. 496 (1986)
(preliminary ruling requested by the Cour d'Appel [Court of Appeal], Colmar, France). The
European Court of Justice has ruled that although execution of an enforcement order follows
the local law of the State where the order is executed, application of local law must not
impair the effectiveness of the Brussels Convention regime. Case 145/86, Hoffman v.
Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645, 666, 670, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494, 504, 506 (1988) (preliminary
ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands); see also Case C-365/88,
Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v. Zeehaghe 1BV , May 15, 1990 (preliminary ruling
requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands) (LEXIS, Europe Library, Cases
File).
220. De Wolf v. Harry Cox B.V., 1976 E.C.R. 1760, 1767, 2 C.M.L.R. 43, 55 (1977)
(preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands); see also
Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v. Palumbo, 1987 E.C.R. 4861, [1989] 1 CEC
(CCH) 504 (1987) (preliminary ruling requested by the Corte Suprema di Cassazione
[Supreme Court], Italy). The Court in De Wolf read article 21 of the Convention as
evincing the drafters' concern for duplicate actions and the conflicts between Member States
that might arise therefrom. De Wolf, 1976 E.C.R. 1760, 2 C.M.L.R. 43.
221. Article 44 provides in part:
An applicant who, in the State of origin has benefited from complete or partial legal
aid or exemption from costs or expenses, shall be entitled, in the procedures provided
for in Articles 32 to 35, to benefit from the most favourable legal aid or the most
extensive exemption from costs or expenses provided for by the law of the State
addressed.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 44; see also DASHWOOD ET AL., supra note
4, at 37. Note that such legal aid is limited to the stage at which the court makes its
original determination whether to issue an enforcement order, and that legal aid for the
appeal of such decisions is left to the discretion of the State in which enforcement is sought.
See LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 317. The text of this provision was amended by the
1978 and 1989 Accession Conventions. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art.
44 n.2.
222. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 33; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 33; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 33; see also 1979 Jenard Report,
supra note 13, at 48.
223. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 46; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
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enforceable, 224 and a local address for the party seeking enforcement. 25
The application must also contain, "where appropriate, a document
showing that the applicant is in receipt of legal aid in the State of
origin. 226 Both of these documents must be translated if the enforcement
court so requires. 227 The enforcement court, however, may not order the
"lgalization or other similar formality" in respect to these documents,
22
but may under certain circumstances accept equivalent documents or
waive the need to produce them altogether.229 The party against whom
enforcement is sought may not, however, make any submissions on his
own behalf, and the initial application process is entirely ex parte.23°
note 1, art. 46; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 46. With respect to the enforcement
of default judgments, the applicant must also supply an authenticated copy of the "document
which establishes that the party in default was served with the document instituting the
proceedings or an equivalent document." Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art.
46(2). On this requirement, see supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
224. Article 47 provides that the applicant must produce "documents which establish
that, according to the law of the State of origin the judgment is enforceable and has been
served." Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 47(1); see also Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 47(1); Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 47(1).
225. The Convention provides:
The procedure for making the application shall be governed by the law of the State in
which enforcement is sought. The applicant must give an address for service of
process within the area of jurisdiction of the court applied to. However, if the law of
the State in which enforcement is sought does not provide for the furnishing of such
an address, the applicant shall appoint a representative ad litem.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 33; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art.
33; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 33. Note that in Germany the applicant
must appoint a guardian ad litem; in the United Kingdom, the clerk of the magistrates' or
sheriff court acts as the guardian ad litem in applications for enforcement of maintenance
orders, unless the applicant makes an alternative arrangement. LASOK & STONE, supra note
4, at 316-17.
The European Court of Justice has read this provision to mean that the obligation to
provide a local service address arises from the local law of the State in which enforcement
is sought. Case 198/85, Carron v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 2437, 2446, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,353 (1986). But even if the local law does not
specify the time in which such an address must be provided, the applicant shall provide his
address no later than the date on which the decision authorizing enforcement is served. Id.
at 2447, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,353. The Court has
ruled, however, that local law determines the consequences, if any, of an applicant's failure
to provide a service address in a timely manner. Id., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,353; see also BYRNE, supra note 4, at 125-26.
226. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note I, art. 47(2); Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 47(2); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 47(2).
227. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 48; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 48; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 48.
228. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 49; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 49; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 49.
229. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 48; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 48; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 48.
230. See Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 34; Lugano Convention,
supra note 43, art. 34. Bartlett notes:
The reasons for choosing ex parte are clear. The Convention does not allow the court
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C. Execution of Enforcement Orders
The Brussels Convention has little to say concerning the execution of
an enforcement order, leaving the matter to the local law of the State in
which enforcement has been ordered. The Convention does provide that
during the time specified for an appeal of an order resulting from the
initial enforcement application, "no measures of enforcement may be
taken other than protective measures taken against the property of the
party against whom enforcement is sought. '231 The court is permitted to
or tribunal to ask the defendant for an explanation, even in exceptional cases. Such
a possibility would mean that the proceedings were not properly ex parte. Courts
might be inclined to hear the defendant, which would in fact result in the ex parte
procedure becoming inter partes. Moreover, there would have been the weakening in
the element of surprise which is necessary in an enforcement procedure if the
defendant is not to have the opportunity of withdrawing his property from any measure
of enforcement.
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 58 n.72; see also LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 317-18;
BYRNE, supra note 4, at 126-27. Allowing a defendant to make submissions would tempt
the court to review the substance of the judgment, which the Convention forbids. See
Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 34; Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art.
34; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 34; see also BYRNE, supra note 4, at 117-18.
The appeal process, however, is inter partes. See LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 321.
231. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 39. The Convention provides
at article 39:
During the time specified for an appeal pursuant to Article 36 and until any such
appeal has been determined, no measures of enforcement may be taken other than
protective measures taken against the property of the party against whom enforcement
is sought.
The decision authorizing enforcement shall carry with it the power to proceed to any
such protective measures.
Id.; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 39.; see also LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at
318-20; BYRNE, supra note 4, at 135-38.
The Court of Justice recognized that article 39 protects the rights of a party who has
obtained an enforcement order by ensuring that the party against whom enforcement is
sought does not frustrate this order by disposing of his property during the pendency of his
appeal. Case 119/84, Capelloni v. Pelkmans, 1985 E.C.R. 3147, 3159, 1 C.M.L.R. 388,
398-99 (1986) (preliminary ruling requested by the Corte Suprema di Cassazione [Supreme
Court], Italy). The law of the State hearing the case governs the procedure by which a
protective order may be put in place. Id. at 3159, 1 C.M.L.R. at 399. Even so, application
of such local law cannot contravene the principles of the Brussels Convention regime. Id.
at 3160, 1 C.M.L.R. at 399.
The Court has ruled that an applicant's right to protective measures flows directly from
the decision authorizing enforcement. For this reason, the applicant need not obtain special
authorization before implementing protective measures. Id. at 3161, 1 C.M.L.R. at 400. His
right to protection commences the moment the enforcement order is rendered and extends
until the expiration of the time required to appeal or, if an appeal is taken, until a decision
is rendered on the appeal. Id., 1 C.M.L.R. at 400.
A party against whom protective measures are taken has no recourse under the Brussels
Convention except for article 36, which permits the appeal of a decision granting an
enforcement order. Id. at 3162, 1 C.M.L.R. at 401. If such a party believes that his rights
have been compromised by the protective measures taken against him, he may, consistent
with the Convention, commence a lawsuit under local law. Id. at 3163, 1 C.M.L.R. at 401.
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"make enforcement conditional on the provision of such security as it
shall determine., 232 A court may enter an order for partial enforcement
of a judgment where enforcement cannot be authorized for all matters
contained in the judgment.233  With respect to judgments requiring
periodic payments, the Convention provides that a "foreign judgment
which orders a periodic payment by way of a penalty shall be enforceable
in the State in which enforcement is sought only if the amount of the
payment has been finally determined by the courts of the State of
origin.
234
D. Appeal
The Brussels Convention provides for two levels of appeal of
enforcement decisions: appeal of the initial decision and appeal of the results
of such appeal. A party may appeal a court's decision to enforce or, in
the rare case, not to enforce a foreign judgment by making a timely appeal235
232. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 38; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 38; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 38. The Court of Justice
has read this provision to allow the reviewing court to require the posting of security only
when the court gives a judgment on appeal. Case 258/83, Calzaturificio Brennero SAS v.
Wendel GmbH Schuhproduktion International, 1984 E.C.R. 3971, 2 C.M.L.R. 59 (1986).
On this decision, see LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 322; K. Lipstein, Enforcement of
Judgments Under the Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention: Safeguards, 36 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 873, 874-76 (1987).
Note also that security cannot be required of a foreign person seeking enforcement
solely because of his status as a foreign person. Article 45 states:
No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required of a party who in
one Contracting State applies for enforcement of a judgment given in another
Contracting State on the ground that he is a foreign national or that he is not domiciled
or resident in the State in which enforcement is sought.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 45.
233. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 42; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note I, art. 42; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 38; see also LASOK & STONE, supra
note 4, at 313 ("Thus, for example, partial recognition and/or enforcement could occur
where the judgment has decided two causes of action, and one of them is outside the scope
of the Convention or the decision on one of them is contrary to the stringent public policy
of the country addressed; and partial enforcement could occur where a money judgment has
been partially satisfied.").
234. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 43; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 43; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 43. This provision was
amended by the 1989 San Sebastian Convention. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note
1, art. 43 n.1.
235. Article 36 specifies the time within which the defendant must file his appeal:
If enforcement is authorized, the party against whom enforcement is sought may appeal
against the decision within one month of service thereof.
If that party is domiciled in a Contracting State other than that in which the decision
authorizing enforcement was given, the time for appealing shall be two months and shall
run from the date of service, either on him in person or at his residence. No extension
of time may be granted on account of distance.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 36; see also Brussels Convention, supra
note 1, art. 36; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 36.
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to the appropriate court.236 The decision on such appeal may itself be
appealed.237 The European Court of Justice has determined that the
Brussels Convention limits the right of appeal to unsuccessful applicants
and respondents, and that it does not permit the appeal of an enforcement
In Hoffman v. Krieg, the European Court of Justice ruled that the time limit set out in
article 36 is mandatory and may not be circumvented by an applicant even where the applicant's
appeal comports with national law. 1988 E.C.R. 645, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494 (1988)
(preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Netherlands). While the
national law of the State of execution generally governs matters of enforcement procedure,
the Court ruled that such law "may not impair the effectiveness of the scheme of the
Convention." Id. at 670, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) at 506. The Court found:
30. It follows that the legal remedies available under national law must be precluded
when an appeal against the execution of a foreign judgment for which an enforcement
order has been issued is lodged by the same person who could have appealed against
the enforcement order and is based on an argument which could have been raised in
such an appeal. In those circumstances, to challenge the execution would be tantamount
to again calling in question the enforcement order after the expiry of the strict time-limit
laid down by the second paragraph of Art. 36 of the Convention, and would thereby
render that provision ineffective.
Id.
The Convention does not specify the time limit for the case in which an applicant wishes
to appeal the court's decision not to enforce his judgment. See Brussels Convention, supra
note 1, arts. 40-41; Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, arts. 40-41; Lugano
Convention, supra note 43, arts. 40-41. Presumably, this is a matter governed by the law
of the forum. See LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 322-23.
236. The courts to which a respondent shall appeal are listed in article 37. Brussels
Convention, supra note 1, art. 37; Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 37(1);
Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 37(1). The courts to which an unsuccessful applicant
may appeal are set out in article 40. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 40; Convention
Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 40(1); Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 40(1).
The second paragraph of article 40 requires that the "party against whom enforcement
is sought shall be summoned to appear before the appellate court." Convention Consolidated
Text, supra note 1, art. 40(2); Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 40(2). The European
Court of Justice has found that this provision requires that a court hearing the appeal of an
applicant whose application for enforcement was denied must hear the party against whom
enforcement is sought - even where the application is dismissed for procedural reasons only.
Case 178/83, Firma P v. Firma K, 1984 E.C.R. 3033, 2 C.M.L.R. 238 (1985) (reference for
a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Frankfurt am Main,
Germany).
237. As to respondents, see Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 37(2);
Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 37(2). And, as to applicants, see Convention
Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 40(2); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art.
40; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 40(2).
The right of appeal under articles 37(2) and 40(2) is limited to final judgments. The
European Court of Justice has determined that an article 37(2) appeal is unavailable against
interim or interlocutory measures. Case 258/83, Calzaturificio Brennero SAS v. Wendel
GmbH Schuhproduktion International, 1984 E.C.R. 3971, 2 C.M.L.R. 59 (1986). The Court
held:
Under the general scheme of the Convention, and in light of one of its principal 1.
objectives, which is to simplify procedures in the State in which enforcement is sought,
that provision [article 37(2)] cannot be extended so as to enable an appeal in cassation
to be lodged against a judgment other than that given on the appeal, for instance
against a preliminary or interlocutory order requiring preliminary inquiries to be made.
Id. at 3983, 2 C.M.L.R. at 71; see also LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 323-24.
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order by interested third parties. 238
The court to which an appeal is taken may stay the appeal pro-
ceedings if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in
the State where the judgment originated,23 9 or it may permit enforcement
conditioned upon the provision of security.2 ° Pending resolution of the
appeal, no enforcement measures may be taken other than protective
measures against the person or property that is the subject of the
enforcement order2"
E. Settlements and Authentic Instruments
The Convention further provides that a document drawn up and
enforceable in one Member State as an "authentic instrument" must be
enforced as such in any other Member State in which a proper application
is made. 2  Also, a settlement "which has been approved by a court in
238. Case 148/84, Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. SA Brasserie du Pecheur, 1985
E.C.R. 1981, 2 C.M.L.R. 496 (1986) (preliminary ruling requested by the Cour d'Appel
[Court of Appeal], Colmar, France); Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645,
[1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494 (1988) (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad [Supreme
Court], Netherlands). The Court in Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank felt that allowing third
party appeals would foil the streamlined process of the Brussels Convention regime. 1985
E.C.R. at 1992, 2 C.M.L.R. at 505-06. In any event, the Court observed, third parties have
recourse to the national law of the State in which the enforcement is levied. Id., 2 C.M.L.R.
at 506. See LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 321.
239. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 38; Convention Consolidated Text, supra
note 1, art. 38; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art. 38; see also supra part IV.C.3.
(discussing "ordinary appeal"); LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 321-22.
The European Court of Justice recently determined that a court asked to stay
proceedings under article 38 may consider only those submissions of the appealing party that
such party was unable to make before the court which rendered the judgment to be enforced.
Case C-183/90, Van Dalfsen v. Van Loon, _ E.C.R. _ (Oct. 4, 1991), discussed in Pieri,
supra note 2, at 554. The Court further ruled in the Van Dalfsen case that the refusal of
the appellate court to stay proceedings pursuant to article 38 does not constitute a "judgment
given on the appeal" within the meaning of article 37(2) and therefore cannot be appealed
pursuant to that provision.
240. See supra note 232.
241. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
242. Article 50 provides:
A document which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument
and is enforceable in one Contracting State shall, in another Contracting State, be
declared enforceable there, on application made in accordance with the procedures
provided for in Article 31 et seq. The application may be refused only if enforcement
of the instrument is contrary to public policy in the State addressed.
The instrument produced must satisfy the conditions necessary to establish its
authenticity in the State of origin.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 50; Lugano Convention, supra note 43, art.
50; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 50. This provision was amended by the
1989 Accession Convention. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 50 n.l.
Note that authentic instruments are enforceable under the ordinary enforcement
procedures set out in article 31. It is also interesting that the only basis for refusing to
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the course of proceedings and is enforceable in the State in which it was
concluded shall be enforceable in the State addressed under the same
conditions as authentic instruments."243
CONCLUSION
The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 'of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is a remarkable accom-
plishment. In the twenty-five years since the Convention was signed, the
EC has moved closer to its goal of social, political, and economic
harmonization. The Brussels Convention has been instrumental to this
purpose. By allowing the free flow of judgments among the Member
States of the Community, the Brussels Convention helps to realize the
goal of a fully integrated Europe. Moreover, with the entry into force of
the Lugano Convention, a coherent regime on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments now exists for all nations of Western Europe.
The European Court of Justice has paid due regard to the significance of
the Brussels Convention as establishing a distinctly European regime. In
its several interpretative rulings, the Court has consistently applied the
Convention with a view toward shaping a body of truly European
procedural rules distinct from the laws of the various Member States.
And so, with each judgment recognized under the Brussels Convention,
the common market of Europe moves closer to legal unity.
enforce an authentic instrument is that such enforcement would contravene the public policy
of the State in which enforcement is sought. This is a much more limited basis for refusal
than that applicable to ordinary judgments enforceable under article 31. See generally
LASOK & STONE, supra note 4, at 324-25.
243. Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 51; Lugano Convention, supra
note 43, art. 51; see also Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 51; LASOK & STONE, supra
note 4, at 324-25. This provision was modified by the 1989 Accession Convention.
Convention Consolidated Text, supra note 1, art. 51 n.2.
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APPENDIX*
CONVENTION
ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS
(90/C 189/02)
PREAMBLE
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
DESIRING to implement the provisions of Article 220 of that Treaty by virtue
of which they undertook to secure the simplification of formalities governing the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals;
ANXIOUS to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons
therein established;
CONSIDERING that it is necessary for this purpose to determine the interna-
tional jurisdiction of their courts, to facilitate recognition and to introduce an
expeditious procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, authentic
instruments and court settlements;
HAVE DECIDED to conclude this Convention ... (and]
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
TITLE I not extend, in particular, to revenue,
customs or administrative matters.
SCOPE
The Convention shall not apply to:
Article 1
1. the status or legal capacity of
This Convention shall apply in civil natural persons, rights in property
and commercial matters whatever the arising out of a matrimonial rela-
nature of the court or tribunal. It shall tionship, wills and succession;
* Unofficial consolidated and updated version of the Brussels Convention produced by
the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413
(1990) (footnotes omitted).
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2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to
the winding-up of insolvent com-
panies or other legal persons, judi-
cial arrangements, compositions
and analogous proceedings;
3. social security;
4. arbitration.
TITLE II
JURISDICTION
TITLE III
RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT
Article 25
For the purposes of this Convention,
"judgment" means any judgment giv-
en by a court or tribunal of a Con-
tracting State, whatever the judgment
may be called, including a decree,
order, decision or writ of execution,
as well as the determination of costs
or expenses by any officer of the
court.
Section 1
RECOGNITION
Article 26
A judgment given in a Contracting
State shall be recognized in the other
Contracting States without any special
procedure being required.
Any interested party who raises the
recognition of a judgment as the prin-
cipal issue in a dispute may, in accor-
dance with the procedures provided
for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Title,
apply for a decision that the judgment
be recognized.
If the outcome of proceedings in a
court of a Contracting State depends
on the determination of an incidental
question of recognition that court shall
have jurisdiction over that question.
Article 27
A judgment shall not be recognized:
1. if such recognition is contrary to
public policy in the State in
which recognition is sought;
2. where it was given in default of
appearance, if the defendant was
not duly served with the docu-
ment which instituted the pro-
ceedings or with an equivalent
document in sufficient time to
enable him to arrange for his de-
fence;
3. if the judgment is irreconcilable
with a judgment given in a dis-
pute between the same parties in
the State in which recognition is
sought;
4. if the court of the State of origin,
in order to arrive at its judgment,
has decided a preliminary ques-
tion concerning the status or legal
capacity of natural persons, rights
in property arising out of a matri-
monial relationship, wills or suc-
cession in a way that conflicts
with a rule of the private interna-
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tional law of the State in which
the recognition is sought, unless
the same result would have been
reached by the application of the
rules of private international law
of that State;
5. if the judgment is irreconcilable
with an earlier judgment given in
a non-contracting State involving
the same cause of action and be-
tween the same parties, provided
that this latter judgment fulfils
the conditions necessary for its
recognition in the state addressed.
Article 28
Moreover, a judgment shall not be
recognized if it conflicts with the
provisions of Sections 3, 4 or 5 of
Title II, or in a case provided for in
Article 59.
In its examination of the grounds of
jurisdiction referred to in the forego-
ing paragraph, the court or authority
applied to shall be bound by the find-
ings of fact on which the court of the
State of origin based its jurisdiction.
Subject to the provisions of the first
paragraph, the jurisdiction of the court
of the State of origin may not be re-
viewed; the test of public policy re-
ferred to in point 1 of Article 27 may
not be applied to the rules relating to
jurisdiction.
Article 29
Under no circumstances may a foreign
judgment be reviewed as to its sub-
stance.
Article 30
A court of a Contracting State in
which recognition is sought of a judg-
ment given in another Contracting
State may stay the proceedings if an
ordinary appeal against the judgment
has been lodged.
A court of a Contracting State in
which recognition is sought of a judg-
ment given in Ireland or the United
Kingdom may stay the proceedings if
enforcement is suspended in the State
of origin, by reason of an appeal.
Section 2
ENFORCEMENT
Article 31
A judgment given in a Contracting
State and enforceable in that State
shall be enforced in another Contract-
ing State when, on the application of
any interested party, it has been de-
clared enforceable there.
However, in the United Kingdom,
such a judgment shall be enforced in
England and Wales, in Scotland, or in
Northern Ireland when, on the appli-
cation of any interested party, it has
been registered for enforcement in
that part of the United Kingdom.
Article 32
1. The application shall be submit-
ted:
- in Belgium, to the tribunal de
premiere instance or rechtbank
van eerste aanleg,
(Vol. 14:559
Summer 19931 Judgments in the European Community
in Denmark, to the byret,
- in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, to the presiding judge of a
chamber of the Landgericht,
in Greece, to the MovopeXU(
UIp Wro8 io,
- in Spain, to the Juzgado de
Primera Instancia,
in France, to the presiding judge
of the tribunal de grande instance,
in Ireland, to the High Court,
in Italy, to the corte d'appello,
in Luxembourg, to the presiding
judge of the tribunal d'arron-
dissement,
in the Netherlands, to the presid-
ing judge of the arrondissements-
rechtbank,
- in Portugal, to the Tribunal Judi-
cial de Circulo,
- in the United Kingdom:
1. in England and Wales, to the
High Court of Justice, or in
the case of maintenance
judgment to the Magistrates'
Court on transmission by the
Secretary of State;
2. in Scotland, to the Court of
Session, or in the case of a
maintenance judgment to the
Sheriff Court on transmission
by the Secretary of State;
3. in Northern Ireland, to the
High Court of Justice, or in
the case of a maintenance
judgment to the Magistrates'
Court on transmission by the
Secretary of State.
2. The jurisdiction of the local
courts shall be determined by refer-
ence to the place of domicile of the
party against whom enforcement is
sought. If he is not domiciled in the
State in which enforcement is sought,
it shall be determined by reference to
the place of enforcement.
Article 33
The procedure for making the applica-
tion shall be governed by the law of
the State in which enforcement is
sought.
The applicant must give an address
for service of process within the area
of jurisdiction of the court applied to.
However, if the law of the State in
which enforcement is sought does not
provide for the furnishing of such an
address, the applicant shall appoint a
representative ad litem.
The documents referred to in Articles
46 and 47 shall be attached to the
application.
Article 34
The court applied to shall give its
decision without delay; the party
against whom enforcement is sought
shall not at this stage of the proceed-
ings be entitled to make any submis-
sions on the application.
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The application may be refused only
for one of the reasons specified in
Articles 27 and 28.
Under no circumstances may the for-
eign judgment be reviewed as to its
substance.
Article 35
The appropriate officer of the court
shall without delay bring the decision
given on the application to the notice
of the applicant in accordance with
the procedure laid down by the law of
the State in which enforcement is
sought.
Article 36
If enforcement is authorized, the party
against whom enforcement is sought
may appeal against the decision with-
in one month of service thereof.
If that party is domiciled in a Con-
tracting State other than that in which
the decision authorizing enforcement
was given, the time for appealing
shall be two months and shall run
from the date of service, either on
him in person or at his residence. No
extension of time may be granted on
account of distance.
Article 37
1. An appeal against the decision
authorizing enforcement shall be
lodged in accordance with the rules
governing procedure in contentious
matters:
- in Belgium, with the tribunal de
premi~re instance or rechtbank
van eerste aanleg,
- in Denmark, with the landsret,
- in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, with the Oberlandes-
gericht,
- in Greece, with the Epereio,
- in Spain, with the Audiencia Pro-
vincial,
- in France, with the cour d'appel,
- in Ireland, with the High Court,
- in Italy, with the corte d'appello,
- in Luxembourg, with the Cour
sup6rieure de justice sitting as a
court of civil appeal,
- in the Netherlands, with the
arrondissementsrechtbank,
- in Portugal, with the Tribunal de
Relaqdo,
- in the United Kingdom:
(a) in England and Wales, with
the High Court of Justice, or
in the case of maintenance
judgment with the Magis-
trates' Court;
(b) in Scotland, with the Court
of Session, or in the case of
a maintenance judgment with
the Sheriff Court;
(c) in Northern Ireland, with the
High Court of Justice, or in
the case of a maintenance
(Vol. 14:559
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judgment with the Magis-
trates' Court.
2. The judgment given on the appeal
may be contested only:
- in Belgium, Greece Spain,
France, Italy, Luxembourg and in
the Netherlands, by an appeal in
cassation,
- in Denmark, by an appeal to the
hojesteret, with the leave of the
Minister of Justice,
- in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, by a Rechtsbeschwerde,
- in Ireland, by an appeal on a
point of law to the Supreme
Court,
- in Portugal, by an appeal on a
point of law.
- in the United Kingdom, by a
single further appeal on a point
of law.
Article 38
The court with which the appeal un-
der Article 37(1) is lodged may, on
the application of the appellant, stay
the proceedings if an ordinary appeal
has been lodged against the judgment
in the State of origin or if the time for
such an appeal has not yet expired; in
the latter case, the court may specify
the time within which such an appeal
is to be lodged.
Where the judgment was given in
Ireland or the United Kingdom, any
form of appeal available in the State
of origin shall be treated as an ordi-
nary appeal for the purposes of the
first paragraph.
The court may also make enforcement
conditional on the provision of such
security as it shall determine.
Article 39
During the time specified for an ap-
peal pursuant to Article 36 and until
any such appeal has been determined,
no measures of enforcement may be
taken other than protective measures
taken against the property of the party
against whom enforcement is sought.
The decision authorizing enforcement
shall carry with it the power to pro-
ceed to any such protective measures.
Article 40
If the application for enforcement is
refused, the applicant may appeal:
- in Belgium, to the cour d'appel
or hof van beroep,.
- in Denmark, to the landsret,
- in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, to the Oberlandesgericht,
- in Greece, to the EqeTeio,
- in Spain, to the Audiencia Pro-
vincial,
- in France, to the court d'appel,
- in Ireland, to the High Court,
- in Italy, to the corte d'appello,
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- in Luxembourg, to the Cour
sup6rieure de justice sitting as a
court of civil appeal,
- in the Netherlands, to the
gerechtshof,
- in Portugal, to the Tribunal da
Relaqio,
- in the United Kingdom:
(a) in England and Wales, to the
High Court of Justice, or in
the case of a maintenance
judgment to the Magistrates'
Court;
(b) in Scotland, to the Court of
Session, or in the case of a
maintenance judgment to the
Sheriff Court;
(c) in Northern Ireland, to the
High Court of Justice, or in
the case of a maintenance
judgment to the Magistrates'
Court.
2. The party against whom enforce-
ment is sought shall be summoned to
appear before the appellate court. If
he fails to appear, the provisions of
the second and third paragraphs of
Article 20 shall apply even where he
is not domiciled in any of the Con-
tracting States.
Article 41
A judgment given on an appeal pro-
vided for in Article 40 may be con-
tested only:
- in Belgium, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Luxembourg and in
the Netherlands, by an appeal in
cassation,
- in Denmark, by an appeal to the
hojesteret, with the leave of the
Minister of Justice,
- in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, by a Rechtsbeschwerde,
in Ireland, by an appeal on a
point of law to the Supreme
Court,
- in Portugal, by an appeal on a
point of law,
- in the United Kingdom, by a
single further appeal on a point
of law.
Article 42
Where a foreign judgment has been
given in respect of several matters and
enforcement cannot be authorized for
all of them, the court shall authorize
enforcement for one or more of them.
An applicant may request partial en-
forcement of a judgment.
Article 43
A foreign judgment which orders a
periodic payment by way of a penalty
shall be enforceable in the State in
which enforcement is sought only if
the amount of the payment has been
finally determined by the courts of the
State of origin.
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Article 44
An applicant who, in the State of
origin has benefitted from complete or
partial legal aid or exemption from
costs or expenses, shall be entitled, in
the procedures provided for in Arti-
cles 32 to 35, to benefit from the
most favourable legal aid or the most
extensive exemption from costs or
expenses provided for by the law of
the State addressed.
However, an applicant who requests
the enforcement of a decision given
by an administrative authority in Den-
mark in respect of a maintenance
order may, in the State addressed,
claim the benefits referred to in the
first paragraph if he presents a state-
ment from the Danish Ministry of
Justice to the effect that he fulfils the
economic requirements to qualify for
the grant of complete or partial legal
aid or exemption from costs or ex-
penses.
Article 45
No security, bond or deposit, however
described, shall be required of a party
who in one Contracting State applies
for enforcement of a judgment given
in another Contracting State on the
ground that he is a foreign national or
that he is not domiciled or resident in
the State in which enforcement is
sought.
Section 3
COMMON PROVISIONS
Article 46
A party seeking recognition or apply-
ing for enforcement of a judgment
shall produce:
1. a copy of the judgment which
satisfies the conditions necessary
to establish its authenticity;
2. in the case of a judgment given
in default, the original or a certi-
fied true copy of the document
which establishes that the party in
default was served with the docu-
ment instituting the proceedings
or with an equivalent document.
Article 47
A party applying for enforcement
shall also produce:
1. documents which establish that,
according to the law of the State
of origin the judgment is enforce-
able and has been served;
2. where appropriate, a document
showing that the applicant is in
receipt of legal aid in the State of
origin.
Article 48
If the documents specified in point 2
of Articles 46 and 47 are not pro-
duced, the court may specify a time
for their production, accept equivalent
documents or, if it considers that it
has sufficient information before it,
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dispense with their production.
If the court so requires, a translation
of the documents shall be produced;
the translation shall be certified by a
person qualified to do so in one of the
Contracting States.
Article 49
No legalization or other similar for-
mality shall be required in respect of
the documents referred tQ in Articles
46 or 47 or the second paragraph of
Article 48, or in respect of a document
appointing a representative ad litem.
TITLE IV
AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS
AND COURT SET'LEMENTS
Article 50
A document which has been formally
drawn up or registered as a authentic
instrument and is enforceable in one
Contracting State shall, in another
Contracting State, be declared en-
forceable there, on application made
in accordance with the procedures
provided for in Article 31 et seq. The
application may be refused only if en-
forcement of the instrument is con-
trary to public policy in the State
addressed.
The instrument produced must satisfy
the conditions necessary to establish
its authenticity in the State of origin.
The provisions of Section 3 of Title
III shall apply as appropriate.
Article 51
A settlement which has been approved
by a court in the course of proceed-
ings and is enforceable in the State in
which it was concluded shall be en-
forceable in the State addressed under
the same conditions as authentic in-
struments.
TITLE V
GENERAL PROVISIONS
TITLE VI
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
TITLE VII
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER
CONVENTIONS
Article 55
Subject to the provisions of the sec-
ond subparagraph of Article 54, and
of Article 56, this Convention shall,
for the States which are parties to it,
supersede the following conventions
concluded between two or more of
them:
Article 56
The Treaty and the conventions re-
ferred to in Article 55 shall continue
to have effect in relation to matters to
which this Convention does not apply.
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They shall continue to have effect in
respect of judgments given and docu-
ments formally drawn up or registered
as authentic instruments before the
entry into force of this Convention.
Article 57
1. This Convention shall not affect
any conventions to which the Con-
tracting States are or will be parties
and which in relation to particular
matters, govern jurisdiction or the
recognition or enforcement of judg-
ments.
2. With a view to its uniform inter-
pretation, paragraph 1 shall be applied
in the following manner:
(a) this Convention shall not prevent
a court of a Contracting State
which is a party to a convention
on a particular matter from as-
suming jurisdiction in accordance
with that Convention, even where
the defendant is domiciled in
another Contracting State which
is not a party to that Convention.
The court hearing the action
shall, in any event, apply Article
20 of this Convention;
(b) judgments given in a Contracting
State by a court in the exercise of
jurisdiction provided for in a
convention on a particular matter
shall be recognized and enforced
in the other Contracting State in
accordance with this Convention.
Where a convention on a particu-
lar matter to which both the State
of origin and the State addressed
are parties lays down conditions
for the recognition or enforce-
ment of judgments, those condi-
tions shall apply. In any event,
the provisions of this Convention
which concern the procedure for
recognition and enforcement of
judgments may be applied.
3. This Convention shall not affect
the application of provisions which, in
relation to particular matters, govern
jurisdiction or the recognition or en-
forcement of judgments and which are
or will be contained in acts of the
institutions of the European Commu-
nities or in national laws harmonized
in implementation of such acts.
Article 58
Until such time as the Convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial
matters, signed at Lugano on 16 Sep-
tember 1988, takes effect with regard
to France and the Swiss Confedera-
tion, this Convention shall not affect
the rights granted to Swiss nationals
by the Convention between France
and the Swiss Confederation on juris-
diction and enforcement of judgments
in civil matters, signed at Paris on 15
June 1869.
Article 59
This Convention shall not prevent a
Contracting State from assuming, in a
convention on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, an obliga-
tion towards a third State not to rec-
ognize judgments given in other Con-
tracting States against defendants
domiciled or habitually resident in the
third State where, in cases provided
Summer 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
for in Article 4, the judgment could
only be founded on a ground of juris-
diction specified in the second para-
graph of Article 3.
However, a Contracting State may not
assume an obligation towards a third
State not to recognize a judgment
given in another Contracting State by
a court basing its jurisdiction on the
presence within that State of property
belonging to the defendant, or the
seizure by the plaintiff of property
situated there:
1. if the action is brought to assert
or declare proprietary or posses-
sory rights in that property, seeks
to obtain authority to dispose of
it, or arises from another issue
relating to such property; or
2. if the property constitutes the
security for a debt which is the
subject-matter of the action.
TITLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 60
[Deleted]
Article 61
This Convention shall be ratified by
the signatory States. The instruments
of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the Council
of the European Communities.
Article 62
on the first day of the third month
following the deposit of the instru-
ment of ratification by the last signa-
tory State to take this step.
Article 63
The Contracting States recognize that
any State which becomes a member
of the European Economic Communi-
ty shall be required to accept this
Convention as a basis for the nego-
tiations between the Contracting
States and that State necessary to
ensure the implementation of the last
paragraph of Article 220 of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic
Community.
The necessary adjustments may be the
subject of a special convention be-
tween the Contracting States of the
one part and the new Member States
of the other part.
Article 64
The Secretary-General of the Council
of the European Communities shall
notify the signatory States of:
(a) the deposit of each instrument of
ratification;
(b) the date of entry into force of this
Convention;
(c) [deleted];
(d) any declaration received pursuant
to Article IV of the Protocol;
(e) any communication made pursu-
ant to Article VI of the Protocol.
This Convention shall enter into force
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Article 65
The Protocol annexed to this Con-
vention by common accord of the
Contracting States shall form an inte-
gral part thereof.
Article 66
This Convention is concluded for an
unlimited period.
Article 67
Any Contracting State may request
the revision of this Convention. In
this event, a revision conference shall
be convened by the President of the
Council of the European Communi-
ties.
Article 68
This Convention, drawn up in a single
original in the Dutch, French, German
and Italian languages, all four texts
being equally authentic, shall be de-
posited in the archives of the Secre-
tariat of the Council of the European
Communities. The Secretary-General
shall transmit a certified copy to the
Government of each signatory State.
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